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ABSTRACT

Title of dissertation:

Application of HFACS Tool for Analysis of Investigation
Reports of Accidents Involving Containerized Dangerous
Cargoes

Degree:

MSc

The dissertation is a study of applying HFACS tool into analyzing investigation
reports of accidents involving containerized dangerous cargoes, with the purpose of
examining the human and organizational factors within this context.

Twelve investigation reports of accidents involving containerized dangerous cargoes
were retrieved from different international sources. The HFACS framework and
taxonomy were chosen to analyze and classify the human factors contained in the
collected investigation reports. By examining the results of it, the utility of HFACS
tool in this domain was tested and ultimately proved to be positively useful. There
are no meaningful statistical trends revealed in the result, especially those associated
with the shipper, even though it was proved in this research that the shipper’s factors
had made an important contribution to the accidents involving containerized
dangerous cargoes. Additionally, shipper’s “barrier” functions in the container
shipping safety system were examined with the use of barrier classification concept.
The limitation of the research was discussed in the last chapter with the hope of
inspiring future research.

KEYWORDS: Accident Investigation, Human Factor, HFACS, Containership,
Dangerous Goods, Shipper
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Chapter 1 Introduction, Purpose and Scope

1.1 Introduction to Maritime Transportation of Containerized
Dangerous Cargoes from a safety point of view

Maritime transportation can be regarded as a separate transportation system,
compared to air, rail and road transportation systems from a safety point of view,
even though it closely interacts with other kinds of transportation systems. Take the
maritime transportation of containerized dangerous cargo as an example. To control
the hazards from amounts of packaged dangerous goods in a container, the whole
transportation process from the shore-based process, like packing, marking, labeling,
placarding declaration, to ship-based process, like loading, unloading, stowage,
segregation, securing, sea-transport, has been addressed and harmonized by a set of
international regulations as follows.

The United Nation’s Economic Commission has developed a Globally Harmonized
System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals (GHS) concerning the
classification of dangerous goods by the types of hazards they pose in order to
improve the protection of human safety, health and the environment, and facilitate
the trade and transport of chemicals on the basis of harmonization of the regulations
on chemicals at various levels – national, regional and worldwide.(Hollnagel, 2008)

To regulate dangerous cargo transportation within the maritime sector under the
umbrella of GHS, International Maritime Organization (IMO) has developed the
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chapter-VII of International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as
amended (SOLAS 74) and annex-III of International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78)
with which the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code is
incorporated to provide detailed compliance standards covering each relevant process
mentioned above.

Domestically, contracting governments are obliged to implement the above
international requirements into the national domain.

It is necessary to clarify here the definition of containerized dangerous cargo
(referred to CDG hereinafter) which is relevant to the scope of this research. It means
the packaged form of dangerous cargo transported within a freight container.
Obviously, this definition combines the meaning of two definitions from IMO
conventions, the definition of packaged dangerous cargo and the freight container,
which are separately stipulated in IMDG Code.

1.2

Safety

Concerns

of

Containerized

Dangerous

Cargo

Transportation at Sea

One of the major changes which has emerged from the globalization of trade has
seen the tonnage of IMDG cargo soar, so that the amount of hazardous cargo on
board a single post-panamax vessel on a voyage from the Far East to Europe could
amount to 10,000 tones and upwards (Mullai Arben & Larsson Everth, 2008).
Generally, it is estimated that between 10% to 15% of the cargoes transported in
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packaged form are dangerous or hazardous from a safety point of view (IMO, 2006).

As an intermodal freight container is sealed when loaded, its contents are not visible unless
the container is inspected. IMO has carried out container inspection programme since
1996 among its member States. The consolidated results of 1996-2001 inspection
revealed that the deficiency rate amounted to 30% (IMO, 2002). Even after 13 years
until 2008, the deficiency rate still disappointedly amounted to 18% (IMO, 2008a).

There is some research trying to analyze the risks of CDG transported by sea from
different points of view. Ellis and Lumsden (2009) have carried out the investigation
on risk associated with the marine transport of undeclared dangerous goods, and
found that: “there is the potential for serious incidents to occur. If undeclared
dangerous goods are released during transport, consequences can be as severe as loss
of life, extensive cargo losses, and vessel damages (Ellis Joanne & Lumsden Kent,
2009).” Günter Wichmann (2006) from Munich Re Group pointed out: “The safe
transportation of dangerous goods is one of the greatest challenges in container
shipping. Even if fires on container ships are much less common than other types of
loss in the marine sector, the damage is usually immense (Günter Wichmann, 2006).”
EMSA (2008) expressed its concern on expensive insurance claims resulting from
containership accidents, and explained the reason: “ton for ton,‘box ships’carry the
cargoes with the highest value of any category of cargo ship, and they are also
rapidly increasing in size. Indeed, some individual containers carry millions of Euros
worth of goods each (European Maritime Safety Agency, 2008).”

The past half century has seen lots of maritime accidents involving CDG, some
resulting in serious losses, such as the “Sealand Mariner” accident in 1998 causing
two fatalities, the “Sea Elegance” accident in 2003 causing one fatality, and the
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“Hyundai Fortune” accident in 2006 causing US$ 300M insurance claims.

Fire/explosion casualties in container cargo spaces have been increasing in the recent
years (IMO, 2007). Most of these accidents involved containerized dangerous
cargoes. This trend of fire/explosion in container cargo spaces has also been proved
by the analysis result of data from Lloyd’s MIU casualty database combined with the
data retrieved from English publications from maritime accident investigation
website of different countries (see figure 1). In the past 20 years, there have been 55
fire/explosion accidents emanated from container cargoes on board containerships
(see appendix 1).

Container fire/explosion accidents/ 5 year periods
25
22
20
16

15
10

10
8

5
0
1990-1994

1995-1999

2000-2004

2005-2009

Figure 1 -Container fire/explosion accidents on board containerships in 1990-2009
Source: retrieved from the Lloyd’s MIU casualty database and English publications from maritime
accident investigation website of different countries
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1.3 Importance of Investigating and Analyzing Human and
Organizational Factors of Maritime Accidents Involving CDG

The industry would benefit more had the day-to-day generated data be analyzed
rather than waiting for an accident to happen (Schroder, 2004). Accident
investigation is one of the tools for improving controls over hazards in the working
environment (Energy Institute, 2008). In the case of a marine event, packaged
dangerous goods may be involved and release their hazards by exposing one or a
combination of the risk receptors, and consequently cause the accident. Accident
investigation and analysis could help us to search below the surface to catch up the
contributing causes/latent conditions, in particular those associated with human and
organizational factors, which could be prevented later on.

Latent conditions are system deficiencies that lead to poor competence, procedures
and equipment. They hide away from the “sharp end” with which they can always
link themselves. To prevent further accidents, it is important to understand these
systems and identify the deficiencies locating inside to develop the solutions. Human
errors occur because the systems for preventing them have failed in some way. An
incident, then, is not a person failure but a system failure. Thus in this sense, an
organization’s safety management system can be thought of as the organization’s
integrated set of processes that support human performance (Energy Institute, 2008).

Human errors make a significant contribution to maritime accidents according to a
wide range of sources of research. Baker and McCafferty (2004) revealed that:
“approximately 50% of maritime accidents are initiated by human error, while
another 30% of maritime accidents occur due to failures of humans to avoid an
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accident. In other words, in 30% of maritime accidents, conditions that should have
been adequately countered by humans were not (Baker & McCafferty, 2004).”
Reason (1997) also expressed his concern with the human and organizational
contribution to systems accidents, because accident analyses reveal that these factors
dominate the risks to complex installations. “Even what appear at first sight to be
simple equipment breakdowns can usually be traced to some prior human failure.
Major accidents arise from the unforeseen interactions of human and organizational
factors (Reason, 1997).”

1.4 Purpose and Scope

The principles can be assembled by combining the knowledge obtained from case
studies with a more adequate theory (or theories) of error production, and applied to
the design and operation of high-risk technological systems to reduce either the
occurrence of errors or their damaging consequences (Reason, 1990).

As the importance of human and organizational factors in terms of contribution to
maritime accidents, the author has decided to investigate them through the
application of a specific analysis tool for the analysis of investigation reports of
maritime accidents involving CDG, with the purpose of revealing any meaningful
trends in the types of human and organizational errors associated.

The author has chosen the adapted Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (HFACS) for ship’s machinery space fires and explosions by Ghirxi and his
corresponding adapted taxonomy as the analytical tool(see appendix 3). The rationale
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for this choice will be explained further in the next section.

The specific objectives for this research are twofold: one is to examine the utility of
Ghirxi’s adapted HFACS framework and taxonomy in recognizing and analyzing the
human factors contained in the investigation reports of maritime accidents involving
containerized dangerous cargo; the other is to examine the thoroughness of the
relevant accident investigation reports, with purpose of determining any meaningful
trends and useful findings in the types of human factors, especially those associated
with the shipper, after the adoption of “Guidelines for the investigation of human
factors in marine casualties and incidents” by Resolution A.884(21)(IMO, 2000) .

To fulfill the above objectives, I will try to find as many investigation reports
associated with the CDG cargo accident by approaching variable international
databases, especially those accidents happened after 2000 year. After retrieving
enough data (investigation reports), detailed analysis will be carried out on these
reports with the use of adopted HFACS tool to find out the contained human factors.
The retrieved human factors will be analyzed and coded against adapted Ghirxi`s
taxonomy with the hope of releasing some useful findings. The last two chapters
(chapter 4 & 5) will further discuss the findings and the limitation of the research.
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Chapter 2 Methodology and Data Resources

2.1 Introduction to Ghirxi’s adapted HFACS framework and
taxonomy

The Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) was originally
developed by the US Department of Defense to investigate aviation mishaps. Later it
was expanded to be seamlessly applied across all services, and is used to investigate
aviation, ground, weapons, afloat, space and off-duty mishaps and events (Shappell
& Wiegmann, 2000). A corresponding comprehensive and open taxonomy was
created to fulfill this achievement.

The value of the HFACS framework is that it can provide a systematic view of the
whole system. A system is a network of many variables in causal relationships to one
another. Thus, it is usually wise when correcting a deficiency to consider it within the
context of its system. Otherwise, we may treat only the symptoms and not the source
of the trouble. We may also overlook the unpleasant side effects of our actions and
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do more harm than good in the long run (Doerner Dietrich, 1996). The HFACS
framework can force the analyzer or investigator to go back from the front line,
through the whole system, to the organizational level, which always embody the root
causes.

However the HFACS framework only provides most of the possible human factors in
general categories. A more detailed taxonomy is required for further analysis and
classification in a specific domain. A taxonomy is usually made for a specific
purpose, and no single scheme is likely to satisfy all needs (Reason, 1990). Thus, the
original HFACS framework and its corresponding taxonomy were adapted by Ghirxi
for a case-base analysis of a number of accident investigation reports into ship
machinery space fires and explosions, considering that the original framework did
not take into account the maritime transportation sector. (Ghirxi, 2008).

The HFACS framework shares the same theoretical basis, Reason’s model, with the
IMO`s Code for the investigation of maritime accidents (IMO, 2000). The choice of
HFACS as the analytical tool can ensure the compatibility of analysis with the
information contained in the investigation reports.

The adapted HFACS framework and taxonomy by Ghirxi (Ghirxi, 2008) is used as
the basic analysis tool. There was a need for some slight modifications to be made to
fit into this research domain. These modifications will be discussed in the next
chapter. The literature review has not shown any other taxonomy developed on the
basis of HFACS framework in the maritime sector.

Since the purpose of this research is not to study the theoretical background of the
HFACS framework, details about the HFACS framework and taxonomy adapted by
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Ghirxi will not be discussed in this paper. Rather, only those necessary topics related
to the later analysis and discussion (chapter 4 & 5) will be introduced in this part.

The HFACS framework as adapted expands Reason’s four levels into thirteen
causal categories as shown in table 1.
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Table 1- The HFACS Framework as adapted for CDG accidents

First Tier
Latent
conditions

Organizational
influences

Unsafe
supervision/
workplace
factors

Preconditions
for unsafe acts

Active
failures

Second Tier

Third Tier

Resources

z
z
z

Human Resources
Technological environment
Equipment/facility resources

Organizational
climate

z
z
z

Structure
Policies
Culture

Organizational Process

z
z
z

Operations
Procedures
Checks & balances

Statutory

z
z

International standards
Flag state implementation

Inadequate supervision z

Shipborne
supervision

Planned inappropriate z
operations

Shipborne operations

Failed
to
correct z
known problems

Shipborne
shortcomings

and

shore

related

Supervisory violations

z

Shipborne violations

Environmental

z

Physical

z

Technological

Crew

z
z

Cognitive factors
Physiological state

Personnel

z
z

Crew resource management
Personal readiness

Error

z
z
z

Skill-based
Decision
Perceptual

z
z

Routine
exceptional

Unsafe acts
Violation
Macro-perspective

Remote
from
the ship

Front
line

Micro-perspective

Source: Kevin T. Ghirxi. (2008). Application of scientific tools for the analysis of accident
investigation reports about engine room fires. Unpublished WMU, Malmo, Sweden.
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Unsafe acts are defined as active actions leading to an error or an unsafe situation.
Reason emphasizes that unsafe acts should happen in temporal and spatial
proximities of a hazard (Reason, 1990), while in the accident cases relating to CDG,
the unsafe act of the operator is usually quite far from the hazard, or to say the hazard
has been existing for quite some time. A typical example is the mistaken stowage of
dangerous cargo by the stowage planner. Thus, in the context of CDG accidents, the
operators of unsafe acts are not limited to crew on board the vessel, but also could
include the front line individuals working on shore as long as they have made the
active failures leading to the accident.

It is important to identify unsafe acts as the first step, so that from where the
investigator could trace backwards until to the highest management level. However
sometimes the investigator should be aware that there could be several unsafe acts
acted by different operators leading to one accident. These operators may locate in
different departments belonging to the same management level, the front line, within
the analyzed organization. Taking the “Sealand Elegance” accident for example, the
chemical dangerous cargo, Calcium Hypochlorite, was mistakenly stowed near the
heat resulting in emanating flammable gas. The flammable gas contained in the cargo
hold later became ignited by the welding slag falling from the hot working by the
ignorant maintenance crew, finally leading to the fire/explosion accident. In this case,
both the wrong stowage by the stowage planner of the shipping company and the
mistaken welding work by the ignorant maintenance crew are regarded as unsafe
acts.

Unsafe acts, in the HFACS framework, are categorized into two groups: errors and
violations, according to whether individuals make them intentionally or
unintentionally (See figure 2). However this does not mean that errors are either
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intended or unintended because individuals do not set out to make an error. Rather it
is the act or the underlying decision process that are intentional or unintentional.
Unsafe acts
Errors

Violations
Skill-based

Routine

Attention failures

Exceptional

Memory
Technique
Decision-based
Procedural decision
Choice decision
Problem solving
Perceptual
Figure 2 - Unsafe acts categorization
Source: Kevin T. Ghirxi. (2008). Application of scientific tools for the analysis of accident
investigation reports about engine room fires. Unpublished WMU, Malmo, Sweden.

The Preconditions for unsafe acts are defined as factors in a mishap if active and/or
latent preconditions such as conditions of the operators, environmental or personnel
factors affect practices, conditions or actions of individuals and result in human error
or an unsafe situation (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Two areas of factors are
considered in this level, the individual and the environmental factors. The individual
factors cover not only physical condition but also the interaction of human. The
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environmental factors have a wide range covering the physical and the technological
environmental factors. Barrier systems are usually categorized in this level as the
technological environmental group. For example, the information of CDG should be
declared on the document by the shipper (the requirement of declaration is regarded
as incorporeal barrier function). If the shipper fails to implement the declaration
requirements, the missing technical information of CDG, regarded as the
precondition factors for the stowage plan, will probably cause the wrong stowage
leading to the accident.

The precondition factors are categorized into three groups: environmental factors,
crew condition, and personnel factors (see figure 3). Environmental factors can be
subcategorized as physical environment and technological environment groups. Crew
conditions can be subcategorized as cognitive factors and physiological state groups.
Personnel factors can be subcategorized as crew interaction and personal readiness
groups.
Precondition for unsafe acts

Environmental

Condition of crew member

Personnel

Physical

Congnitive factors

Crew interaction

Technological

Physiological state

Personal readiness

Figure 3 - Categorization of precondition for unsafe acts
Source: Kevin T. Ghirxi. (2008). Application of scientific tools for the analysis of accident
investigation reports about engine room fires. Unpublished WMU, Malmo, Sweden.
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Unsafe supervision factors are defined as factors in a mishap if the methods,
decisions or policies of the supervisory chain of command (officers at management
level over operational and support level) directly affect practices, conditions, or
actions of individual and result in human error or an unsafe situation (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2000).

Four groups are categorized under the unsafe supervision level: inadequate
supervision, planned inappropriate operations, failed to correct known problems, and
supervisory violations (see figure 4)

Unsafe
supervision

Inadequate
supervision

Planned
inappropriate
operations

Failure to correct
known problems

Supervisory
violations

Shipborne and
shore supervision

Shipborne
operations

Shipborne
related
shortcomings

Shipborne
violations

Figure 4 - Categorization of unsafe supervision factors
Source: Kevin T. Ghirxi. (2008). Application of scientific tools for the analysis of accident
investigation reports about engine room fires. Unpublished WMU, Malmo, Sweden.

Organizational factors are factors in a mishap if the communications, actions
omissions or policies of upper-level management directly or indirectly affect
supervisory practices, conditions or actions of the crew member(s) and result in
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system failure, human error or an unsafe situation (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000).

Four groups are categorized under the organizational level: resource management,
organizational climate, organizational process and statutory. Resource management is
subcategorized as human resources, technological resources, and equipment/facility
resource groups. The organizational climate is subcategorized as operations,
procedures, and oversight groups. The organizational climate is subcategorized as
structure, policies, and culture; Statutory, as the new added category by Ghirxi, is
subcategorized as international/national standards, and flag state implementation.

Organizational influences

Resource
management

Organizational
climate

Organizational
process

Statutory

Human
resources

structure

operations

International/
National

Technological
environment

policies

procedures

Flag state
implementation

Equipment/
facility

culture

oversight

Figure 5 - Organizational influences categorization
Source: Kevin T. Ghirxi. (2008). Application of scientific tools for the analysis of accident
investigation reports about engine room fires. Unpublished WMU, Malmo, Sweden.
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2.2 Retrieving and Coding of Human Contributing Factors into
Adapted HFACS Taxonomy

In order to indentify the human factors contained in the investigation reports and
classify them into the right plane of the HFACS framework, it is important to
understand the relationship between different factors. As the HFACS framework does
not provide tools for identifying this relationship or failed path, other helpful tools
should be adopted for this research.

Figure 6 shows that an event involves hazards coming into damaging contact with
targets (people, assets, environment) as the result of a defensive failure. If starting
with the end result, the analyst is capable of tracing backwards to determine the
nature of the failed defence(s) and the hazard (Reason, 1997).
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Figure 6 - Reason’s human factor model
Source: Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Aldershot: Ashgate.

For this research, the author chose the barrier analysis combined with time-lines as
the description tool. The concept of barrier provides one of the few opportunities to
model interactions and complexity in high risk domains (Reason, 2006). Due to their
nature, barriers must always be seen in relation to a potential flow of mass, energy,
and information or control. It is therefore natural to base barrier analysis on a
representation of possible sequences of functions or successions of events such as
time-lines or tree diagrams (Hollnagel, 2004).

It is important to point out that the contents to be analyzed are all from the analysis
part of the investigation reports. From that part of each report, the mentioned
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contributing factors are retrieved and analyzed in this research paper. This approach
avoided the “re-investigation” of the accident, which would have otherwise led to
subjective interpretations (Ghirxi, 2008).

After finishing the analysis and description of all the accidents, all of the found
human factors are coded manually by the author against the Ghirxi`s adapted
taxonomy (see appendix 3). If one factor can not be fitted into any nanocode, then
consideration should be given to create a new one. Totally there are two new
nanocodes created to suit this research. They are explained in the analysis chapter.

Much time and great attention were paid to verifying the final coding results and the
adapted modifications to be consistent with the original HFACS framework and
taxonomy.

2.3 Data

A comprehensive international review of the investigation reports of accidents
involving CDG has been carried out on the web-base. The IMO Global Integrated
Shipping Information System (GISIS), IMO`s DSC sub-committee section of IMO
document website, the casualty database of Lloyd’s MIU, English publications from
maritime accident investigation website of different countries were examined to
retrieve qualified investigation reports. Two Chinese investigation reports were
obtained through the China Maritime Safety Administration. The sources of the
retrieved investigation reports are illustrated in appendix 2 respectively.
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Only investigation reports investigating ships falling under SOLAS 1974 were
retrieved to ensure compliance with the IMDG Code and other international
regulation. This can also ensure that the master and the crews being investigated
show the minimum quality standard as required by the International Convention on
Standard of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers,1978, as
amended in 1995(STCW 1978).

There is one exceptional case, Wing On No.1, 1999, which is a local ship in Hong
Kong. This case is included in this analysis data because of two reasons. One is that
it shows a valuable lesson to the world with regard to the transportation of fuelled
used motor vehicles/cycles and related spare parts. The other is that after this
accident, the Hong Kong government carried out an investigation on the local
regulatory scheme concerning this issue. This report, which could be regarded as the
supplement to the casualty investigation report, gives us valuable information with
regard to human factor analysis.

Finally, 12 investigation reports have been collected. Of these, 7 are attributed or
partly attributed to human causes. The remaining 5 are of unknown origin causes (see
table 2).
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Table 2- Accidents Involving Containerized Dangerous Cargoes

Ship name

Type/country

year

Accident type

Main
Contributing
Factors

MOR UK

Containership/Cyprus

1995

DG leakage

Unknown

SEALAND
MARINER

Containership/
Marshall Islands

1998

Explosion,
two fatalities

Shipper’s
Misdeclaration

WONG ON
NO.1

Container lighter/HK

1999

Explosion,
one fatality

Shipper’s
Undeclaration

KITANO

Containership/Japan

2001

fire

Unknown

DUTCH
NAVIGATOR

Container feeder/
Netherlands

2001

Shift of containers
/ DG leakage

Multiple

SEA
ELEGANCE

Containership/Singapore

2003

Fire, one fatality

Shipper’s
Undeclaration

LT UTILE

Containership/Panama

2003

Fire

Unknown

CSAV ITAJAI

Containership/Marshal

2004

Fire

Wrong stowage

PUNJAB
SENATOR

Containership/Germany

2005

Fire, explosion

Wrong stowage

KOTA
PAHLAWAN

Containership/Liberia

2006

DG leakage

Shipper’s
Wrong package

CMA CGM
FIDELTO

Containership/France

2007

Explosion/
DG leakage

Unknown

HANJIN
LONDON

Containership/
South Korea

2007

DG leakage

Unknown

Total number: 12 cases
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Chapter 3 Findings of the Accident Investigation
Reports Analysis
The human and organizational factors retrieved from the accident reports were coded
against Ghirxi’s taxonomy (see appendix 3). Some slight modifications have been
adapted to suit the research domain and will be explained in this section.

3.1 Identification of Contributing Factors

Totally 32 contributing factors were retrieved from 7 reports with the use of the
modified HFACS framework. No contributing factor was found in the other 5 reports
due to the insufficient investigation (the coding result is illustrated in Table 3).
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Table 3- Classified Contributing Factors Against Ghirxi’s Taxonomy

Sealand
Mariner
Total

32 6

Unsafe acts

8

AE 103

7

1

AE 201

1

1

Preconditions

Dutch
Sea
Navigator Elegance

Csav
Itajai

Punjab
Senator

Kota
Pahlawan

4

5

4

5

7

1

1

2

1

1

1

4

PE 202

1

PE 205

2

PE 214

1

Supervision

Wing
On
No.1

1
1

1
1

13

SI 001

5

1

SI 004

1

1

SI 007

7

1

Organizational

7

OR 003

1

OR 205

1

FS 001

5

2
1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1
1
1

1

1

1

1

The other 5 cases, Mor UK, Kitano, LT Utile, CMA CGM Fidelto, Hanjin London are not
attributable.
Remark: Detailed coding results are illustrated in appendix 2.

Among these factors, the supervision factors take the largest number compared to
others. On the contrary, the precondition factors amount to the lowest number group.

There are also 7 other contributing factors identified, but hard to be categorized into
any category of Ghirxi’s taxonomy (see table 4). For example, in the “Sea Elegance”
case, the undeclaration of CDG by the shipper has contributed to the accident, but
there is no enough information contained in the investigation report addressing the
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relationship between the shipper and the shipping company. It is still not clear how
and where this shipper’s failure has influenced the individual and organization
behavior of the shipping company.
Table 4- Summary of the uncoded contributing factors

Ship name/actor

Contributing factors

Mor U.K./
shipper

The suspect tank containing between 20 and 80 percent of
its capacity, which should not be offered for transport by
ship, resulted in a liquid surge and increased the vertical
loads at one end.

SEALAND MARINER/
Shipper

Failure to properly declare and document the hazard class
on the shipping papers presented to the vessel’s agent.

SEALAND MARINER/
Shipper

Failure to mark and placard the container.

SEALAND MARINER/
Shipper

Failure to pack the cargo in accordance with the IMDG
Code requirements.

SEA ELEGANCE/
Shipper

Failure to declare the dangerous goods

KOTA PAHLAWAN/
Shipper

The xanthates carried by “KOTA PAHLAWAN” were not
hermetically sealed strictly by the shipper in accordance
with the IMDG Code.

DUTCH NAVIGATOR/
Maintenance company

The framework and the liner integrity of the tank container
were impaired due to the improper repair by the
maintenance organization, contributing to the collapse of
the framework and the leakage of the content.
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3.2 Identification of Unsafe Acts

There are only 8 unsafe acts identified from 6 of total 12 accidents. The identification
percentage is 50%. This shows that only half of the investigations can conclude with
direct failure.

Seven of 8 unsafe acts are fitted into AE 103, failure to see or avoid. Among these
7 factors, 5 are associated with the stowage planner of the company who failed to
scrutinize the undeclared dangerous cargo, or stow the dangerous cargo correctly,
leading to an unsafe situation. Two are associated with the chief mate failing to stow
the dangerous goods correctly.

3.3 Identification of Precondition Factors

There are only 4 preconditions identified. There is a very little identification rate
compared to other category’s, but this does not mean that precondition is not
important in terms of contribution to the whole event. For instance, the cargo
information in the vicinity of the location where a fire accident happens is the
precondition for the firefighting activity to mitigate the consequence. This
information is vitally important for the fire fighter to be able to decide which fire
extinguishing strategy, such as water or carbon dioxide, should be adopted to fight
against the fire (to mitigate the consequence of the fire accident) in the cargo hold.

This can explain the insufficient investigation of some reports where only unsafe acts
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were identified, but not the precondition factors. Finally, the investigator failed to
trace back the events from the unsafe acts, and lost valuable information at the
precondition level.

The nanocode of PE 214, machinery space system knowledge, was adapted as
illustrated in the following to suit the research domain:

PE 214 CARGO HOLD/MACHINERY SPACE SYSTEM KNOWLEDGE
A factor when the individual has no adequate or suitable knowledge of the cargo hold
or the machinery space schematics and line/electrical installations.

3.4 Identification of Supervision Factors

Thirteen supervision level factors were identified and all fell into 2 groups. Five
factors are categorized as SI 001, leadership/supervision/oversight inadequate,
associating with failure to oversee the wrong stowage carried out by the stowage
planner. Another 7 factors are fitted into SI 007, failure to provide current
public/adequate technical information or procedure, associating with failure to
provide adequate technical information related to the designated task, like cargo
information in the vicinity of hot work, cargo information inside the container to be
shifted, cargo hold information related to the cargo stowage operation.

To suit this research domain, the nanocode SI 007, failure to provide current
public/adequate technical data or procedures, has been slightly modified as illustrated
in the following:
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SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL
DATA OR PROCEDURES

A factor when current technical information related to the cargo to be operated, or the
running of the machinery space, or maintenance of machinery in the machinery space
is not provided to other crew members at management level and/or at operational and
support level leading to a dangerous error in judgment/decision.

3.5 Identification of Organizational Factors

Seven organizational factors were identified in 5 of total 12 accidents. Five were
categorized as FS 001, rule-making process, associating with failure to anticipate the
potential risks involved, resulting in a loop-hole/weakness in the international
regulations, i.e. in “Sea Elegance” case, the investigator suggested that “Serious
thought should be given to carrying Calcium Hypochlorite in refrigerated containers,
especially where the transit takes place in or through the tropics, which addresses a
higher risk of carriage of Calcium Hypochlorite in or through the tropics than IMDG
Code does.” The similar suggestions were also given by the investigators in “CSAV
Itajai”, “CMV Punjab” and “Kota Pahlawan” cases (details referred to Table 8 on
page 36).
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Chapter 4 Discussion of the Findings
4.1 The Utility of Ghirxi`s Adapted HFACS Framework and
Taxonomy for the Analysis of Accidents Involving Containerized
Dangerous Cargo

It always turns out that the very rare accidents are not due to unique causes, but
rather are due to the unexpected, and therefore in this sense, unique combination of
common factors (Hollnagel, 2004). The human factor, especially the causal factors
should not vary so much from different mishaps. In fact, most mishaps have very
similar causes (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Ghirxi`s research focuses on the
engine room fire domain, which belongs to the same maritime sector as this research.
That is why theoretically his work can be trusted here. This also proves one of the
purposes of Ghirxi’s study: to provide a platform, which will serve as the foundation
for more detailed studies (Ghirxi, 2008).

The analysis result has shown that 7 reports yielding out 32 findings, while the
remaining 5 reports yield nothing. This is not because of the potential disutility of the
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HFACS framework, but for the following reasons. One is that accident proof was
hard to be collected for analysis after a fire or explosion, especially after long-time
fire extinguishing efforts. Almost all the proof such as the source of the fire was
either consumed or washed or jettisoned. The other reason is because of the
complicated chemical reaction of the dangerous chemical cargoes which usually
emanate heat and/or flammable gas in the onset of an accident resulting in
fire/explosion. It is difficult to artificially replicate the same chemical reaction in the
laboratory for the proof reason. Like the “LT utile” accident of which the
investigation did not come to a conclusion, the biggest possibility for the cause of the
fire which the investigator can hypothesize is the dangerous chemical cargo leaking
from the package released the heat from the chemical reaction with the scrap iron
inside the container such as the reducer agent. However this hypothesis was never
proved during the investigation.

4.2 The multiplicity of unsafe acts involving the stowage planner and
the shipper

Active failures are committed by those at the “sharp end” or front-line of the system .
The complexity of the system will contribute to the multiplicity of unsafe acts. All
unsafe acts can be lumped into a single category, but errors take different forms,
have different psychological origins, occur in different parts of the system and
require different methods of management (Reason, 1997). In order to figure out who
was located at the “sharp-end” of an accident, the investigator has to understand the
system, especially the function of each part of it. The role of a system model is
essential in considering how systems can malfunction, or in other words in thinking

29

about accidents. The structure of a system is often less important than the function,
and the latter may require a breakdown that does not map easily onto the structure
(Hollnagel, 2008).

Even though the stowage planners are not on board the ship, they are located in the
front line of the management. In a modern containership company, the stowage
planner takes the function of the cargo stowage from the chief mate on board the ship,
while the master and the mate play the supervision role comparatively. This can
explain why there are not so many precondition factors revealed in the reports, since
the stowage planner is on the shore side, far away from the investigator.

The shipper’s relationship with the container shipping company is not fully
investigated in the investigation reports. Consequently there is no enough
information revealed about the shipper’s failures, such as why the shipper neither
declared the cargo as dangerous, nor packed the dangerous cargo in compliance with
statutory requirements. In this sense, this research was not able to reveal any findings
associated with shipper. The next sub-section 4.3 will try to analyze the functions of
the shippers from a systematic point of view, hoping to provide the basis for future
research.

4.3 Tentative Analysis of Barrier Functions of Shipper Regarding
the Safety Transportation of Containerized Dangerous Cargo

Shippers are closely involved in the transportation service. They are in charge of the
packing, marking, placarding, labeling and declaring dangerous cargo according to

30

the relevant statutory requirements such as the IMDG Code. All these requirements
are designed to achieve specific safety functions. Identification of these functions
will provide useful cues in understanding the whole system, which is the prerequisite
for the accident investigation.

Defenses are measures designed to protect the hazard or to mitigate the consequences
of equipment or human failures, compromising both technical and human elements.
Reason’s model (illustrated in figure 6 on page 18) describes how latent failure
conditions coming from the organizational processes could degrade the defences,
thereby leaving the way open for unsafe acts to become accidents. In order to
identify the human factors, we have to know which attributed defence has failed.

Based on the nature of barriers, the barrier system is classified into the following four
categories (Hollnagel, 2004): physical or material barrier system, functional (active
or dynamic) barrier systems, symbolic barrier systems, and incorporeal barrier
systems.

The shipper, who has the same meaning as “consignor” for the purpose of the IMDG
Code, means any person, organization or Government which prepares a consignment
for transport (IMO, 2008b). Provisions are set forth for dangerous goods
consignments relevant to authorization of consignments and advance notifications,
packing, marking, labeling, documentation and placarding.

31

4.3.1 PACKING as physical barrier functions

When preparing dangerous goods, the shipper must comply with the IMDG Code
requirements on packing, so as to ensure the barrier functions of packing are fulfilled
during the whole transportation. Table 5 shows the examples of the physical
functions of packing system.
Table 5 -Barrier functions for the shipper as the physical barrier systems

Barrier functions

Examples

Containing or protecting
Containers, tanks, valves, etc.
to prevent transporting something from
the present location (e.g. release) or into
the present location (penetration)
Restraining or preventing
Restricted physical movements of liquid
Movement or transportation of mass or (limitation of ullage)
energy
Keeping together
Cohesion, resilience, indestructibility

Components that do not break or fracture
easily, e.g., safety glass.

Separating, protecting, blocking

Scrubbers, filters,etc.

Adapted from barrier functions and barrier systems (Hollnagel, 2004)

4.3.2 Documentation, Marking, Labeling, Placarding as symbolic
barrier functions

Similar to the packing function, the shipper has to prepare the dangerous cargo in
compliance with the requirements on documentation, marking, labeling and
placarding. These belong to the symbolic barrier systems as illustrated in table 6.
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Table 6-Barrier functions for the shipper as the symbolic barrier systems

Barrier functions

Examples

Coding of functions (colour, shape,
Countering, preventing or thwarting
spatial layout such as marking or labeling
actions(visual, tactile, interface design)
on the packages and containers)
Regulating actions
Dangerous goods declaration procedure
Indicating
system
status
or Maximum load signs on the container
condition(signs, signals and symbols)
and package
Permission or authorization (or the lack
Authorization of dangerous goods
thereof)
Communication,
dependency

interpersonal

Advance notification of dangerous goods

Adapted from barrier functions and barrier systems (Hollnagel, 2004)

4.3.3 Statutory Requirements as Incorporeal Barrier Functions

The shipper also undertakes the legal and moral obligation to ensure the safety
standard of transporting CDG, just like the functions of the incorporeal barrier
systems as illustrated in table 7.

Table 7- Barrier functions for the shipper as the Incorporeal barrier systems

Barrier functions

Examples

Complying, conforming to
Prescribing:
prohibitions

rules,

laws,

Self-restraints of shipper, social pressure
guidelines, Rules stipulated in the bill of lading,
international or domestic laws

Adapted from barrier functions and barrier systems (Hollnagel, 2004)
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The quality of symbolic and incorporeal barriers is highly dependent on humans.
Since incorporeal barriers depend on the user’s willingness to enforce them, they are
comparatively not as same efficient and robust as the physical and symbolic barriers.
They are not applicable to safety critical tasks, and difficult for the evaluation. Their
availability is also uncertain since it depends on whether the user remembers them in
the situation. They also completely depend on the user’s compliance. They may
nevertheless be attractive because the resource needs are low, as is the delay in
implementation. Unless the population of users has unusually high moral standards,
incorporeal barrier systems are not recommended, except as a temporary remedy
(Hollnagel, 2004). The above discussion about the shortcoming of incorporeal
barriers systems explains to us the reason why the population of shipper is vital
important for the implementation of IMDG Code, and ultimately responsible for the
casualty. The classification of barriers is not always a simple matter, but the reward
is worthwhile in helping us to understand the accident.

4.4 Identified organizational factors including the added up
statutory factors
The various ways in which human, technical and organizational factors can combine
to produce organizational accidents are still not fully known and are perhaps
ultimately unknowable, since each major organizational accident seems to throw up a
fresh set of surprises. Organizational factors are universally difficult to be
investigated, because they have multiple causes involving many people operating at
different levels of their respective companies (Reason, 1997). They are usually
located remotely from the front-line, causing additional burdens, such as time and
money, for the investigating body. Reason further explains this concern from the
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human resource point of view. This additional evaluative burden is not lightened by
the fact that most regulatory staffs possess expertise in technical and operational
matters rather than in human and organizational factors (Reason, 1997).

Organizational factors were found as not being adequately addressed in this research
either. Only 2 factors were identified excluding the other 5 statutory factors. The
links between what is perceived to be front-line failures and wrong organizational
decisions are not significantly identified, conclusions that indicated such do not
provide a supporting structure as to why it was perceived that the blunt-end
individuals had failed in their duties.

It is surprising to see that 5 statutory factors were identified from 5 reports showing a
high identification percentage compared to other organizational factors. This
coincides with the concern that due to a lack of feedback or otherwise, the IMO
rule-making process does not keep abreast with technological advances or modern
designs. This may lead to situations where shortcomings in regulations only come to
light following the onset of an accident or are revealed by an accident investigation
(Ghirxi, 2008).

Regulators are uniquely placed to function as one of the most effective defences
against organizational accidents (Reason, 1997). Just like the above analysis, IMO
regulations such as the IMDG Code undertake the functions of incorporeal barrier
systems. They are continually being amended to prohibit actions that have been
implicated in some recent accident or incident. However regulations and procedures
share with other feedforward control devices the problem of being insensitive to
local conditions. From table 8, we can see that the regulator’s failure to identify and
react to specific dangerous goods contributed to the accident.
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Table 8-Summary of the Statutory Contributing Factors

Ship name

Statutory Contributing factors

WING ON
NO.1

The later investigation report on the regulatory scheme on this issue
revealed that the existing legislation is inadequate in regulating the
conveyance of used motor vehicles/cycles and their spare parts. It
further addressed that the deterrence from the safety guidelines for the
transport of motor vehicles/cycles is insufficient and too indirect.
After a number of incidents with Calcium Hypochlorite, the Salvage
Association and the International Group of P&I Clubs issued pertinent
recommendations, which addressed higher risks of carrying Calcium
Hypochlorite than IMDG Code does. Plus, the recommendations of
this investigation report suggested that the IMO DSC sub-committee

SEA
should be asked to further investigate the carriage requirements of
ELEGANCE
Calcium Hypochlorite and amend the IMDG Code as appropriate.
Serious thought should be given to carrying Calcium Hypochlorite in
refrigerated containers, especially where the transit takes place in or
through the tropics, which addresses a higher risk of carriage of
Calcium Hypochlorite in or through the tropics than IMDG Code does.

CSAV
ITAJAI

It is recommended that further precautionary measures should be
considered by the IMO DSC subcommittee to control the temperature
of Thiourea Dioxide throughout the carriage process, like stowage
away from radiant heat or for carriage in reefer containers or
ventilation.

CMV
PUNJAB

It is recommended that further precautionary measures should be
considered by the IMO DSC subcommittee to designate NiMH
rechargeable batteries as dangerous cargo or cargo to be cooled.

The ATSB has advised that xanthates have a recognized capacity to
emit the odour of carbon disulphide even when packaged in
accordance with the IMDG Code and an odour from xanthates
KOTA
shipments, similar to Kota Pahlawan`s, is commonplace according to
PAHLAWAN their Australian importers. This suggests that the information for
xanthates and requirements for their carriage, in particular the
packaging, provided in the Code is not enough to address the hazard,
and thus should be reviewed.

36

Of course it is fair to say that the regulators cannot foresee all the possible scenarios
of failure in complex, tightly-coupled and highly interactive systems, so cannot
universally prescribe particular types of human response. The regulator’s position
within the affected organization means that they are likely to attract blame from all
directions. Since standing as they do on the organizational borders of all hazardous
technologies, their sphere of responsibilities is bound to be implicated in a wide
variety of contributing factors. However, if the regulators are to be other than
convenient scapegoats, they will have to be provided with the legislation, the
resources and the tools to do their jobs effectively (Reason, 1997).
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Chapter 5 Limitations of Research, Conclusions and Future
Research

The main motivation trying to understand accidents is to prevent them from
happening again (Hollnagel, 2004). However there are always limitations to this
objective from the reality or the theoretical world. This chapter will try to address
these limitations from different points of views.

5.1 Limitation of data in revealing any statistical trend

The problem in accident analysis is mainly to get sufficient data and information
about what took place (Hollnagel, 2004). In this research, the utility of the HFACS
framework in identifying and classifying human factors from the reports is also
limited by the data and information contained in the accident reports.

First, only 12 investigation reports were retrieved from global sources on the
web-base. For the remaining relevant accidents involving CDG, the investigations
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were either not carried out or not revealed to the public or not available in English.
Second, since a written account has the effect of “digitizing” what in the original was
a complex and continuous set of “analogue” events, an accident report will always
contain less information than was potentially available (Reason, 1990). Third, most
importantly, the inquisition of the investigator is not thorough enough to discuss the
organizational being of the system under investigation (Ghirxi, 2008). Only 2
organizational factors were identified in the analysis apart from the remaining 5
organizational factors which were all lumped into statutory category. For the
investigation carried out after 2000 when the “Guidelines for The Investigation of
Human Factors in Marine Casualties and Incidents” (Resolution A. 884(21)) was
adopted to amend Resolution A.849 (20), the analysis result did not reveal any
meaningful change in terms of human factors found compared to those carried out
before 2000.

The retrieved human and organizational factors may be used for more general
consideration of shipping, but are not enough to reveal any convincible statistical
trend with the purpose of improving the safe transportation of CDG.

5.2 Limitation of HFACS framework in identifying Human Factors

The utility of the HFACS framework in identifying human factors / the weakness
within the system has been tested and proved in this research, but its theoretical
limitation is more worthwhile to be discussed here from an academic perspective.
The HFACS framework is built on Reason’s human factor model, which belongs to
the group of epidemiological models. Thus, the HFACS framework inherits the
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shortcomings from it.

Epidemiological models are structurally and functionally underspecified but are
valuable because they provide a basis for discussing the complexity of accidents that
overcome the limitations of sequential models. Unfortunately, epidemiological
models are never stronger than the analogy they use, and they are often difficult to
specify in further detail, even though they have been instrumental in developing
methods that can be used to characterize the general “health” of a system (Reason,
1997). In this sense, Reason` model is insufficiently specific regarding the nature of
the holes in the cheese and their inter-relationships (Reason, 2006).

If a system is described using an epidemiological model type, then accident analysis
becomes a search for known carriers and latent conditions. The underlying
assumption is that defences and barriers can be strengthened to prevent future
accidents from taking place, even though the detailed pathways may be uncertain
(Hollnagel, 2008).

Rather than describing the accident and finally giving the clues for the solution, the
HFACS framework concentrates on the classification of human factors in each level
within the organization to give a data-driven basis for the analytical utility. Or like
Reason declares: “we cannot prevent latent conditions from being seeded into the
system since they are inevitable product of strategic decisions. All we can usefully do
is to make them visible to those manage and operate the organization so that the
worst of them, at any one time, can be corrected (Reason, 1997).”

In the realm of error management, HFACS tools can be regarded as the starting point
or the basis to provide a discussion platform, and a communicating language for all

40

parties involved in error management. However this utility is still far from the
purpose of Karl Weick (1991): “to anticipate and forestall disaster is to understand
regularities in the way small events can combine to have disproportionately large
effects (Weick, 1991).”

In order to understand accidents it is necessary to describe them, and the description
inevitably involves the use of an accident model. The three types of accident models,
the sequential models, the epidemiological models and the systemic models,
correspond to the gradual realization that accidents are due to complex coincidences
rather than root causes (Hollnagel, 2004).

A more advanced model is needed to fulfill this task such as the systemic models.
The overriding advantage of systemic models is their emphasis that accident analysis
must be based on an understanding of the functional characteristics of the system,
rather than on assumptions or hypotheses concerning interaction between structures
or internal mechanisms as provided by standard representations of, e.g., information
processing or failure pathways (Hollnagel, 2008).

5.3 Limitation of the “Stop Rules” of the Investigation in Revealing
Shipper’s contributing factors

Ghirxi expanded the HFACS framework to regulator level by adding up statutory and
flag state factors into the organizational level. It is found helpful in identifying
relevant organizational factors in this research. Five statutory factors were
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recognized from 5 reports.

The efforts to identify the contributing factors associated with the shippers failed to
reveal any results. This is because that compared to statutory factors, it is harder to
blame the shipper who is usually located in another country/region different from the
investigating state. Because of the sovereign rights, the investigating country can not
go to another country to investigate the shipper. Consequently, information related to
the shipper is not investigated and the links between the shippers and the shipping
companies are not addressed.

Reason also observes this concern. He points out that leaving aside legal concern
with responsibility, accident investigations are carried out for two main reasons: to
establish what occurred and to stop something like it happening in the future. Both of
these ends are best satisfied by limiting the scope of the analysis to those things over
which the people involved, and most particularly the system manager, might
reasonably be expected to exercise some control (Reason, 1997).

Our main interest must be in the changeable and the controllable. For these reasons,
and because the quantity and reliability of the relevant information will deteriorate
rapidly with increasing distance from the event itself, the accident causation model
presented in figure 6 (page 19) must, of necessity, be confined largely to the
manageable boundaries of the organization concerned (Reason, 1997).

This is why Reason’s human error model stops at the production organization
boundary (see figure 7). The raw material provider, like the shipper, is not addressed
in this model; the philosophy behind it is that the hazard embodied in the raw
material will be filtered out or controlled by the defences provided in the safety
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management system. For instance, the newly produced container should be examined
and endorsed by the competent organization before being put into service to ensure it
is safe enough for service.

Layout of the essential elements of the production organization

Shipper
organization

Figure 7- Interaction between the production and the shipper organization

Adapted from Human Error (Reason, 1990)

With globalization, the supply chain has changed so much that the supplier is
regarded as part of the production system. Just like the shipper, they not only provide
cargo for the shipping company, but also are responsible for the safety defense
system of the cargo, e.g., packing, marking, placarding, labeling and declaring. In
this sense, the production system defined in figure 7 has been expanded to the
shipper. Consequently, the scope of the investigation should be expanded to the
shipper as well.
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Over the past 30 years, the search for the causes of a major catastrophe has spread
steadily outwards in scope and backwards in time to uncover increasingly more
remote contributions (Reason, 1997). Since time and causality are seamless, they
have no natural breakpoints, only artificially imposed ones. Accident analysts, just
like historians, are limited by their resources and by the availability of reliable
evidence.

5.4 Conclusion and future research

The utility of Ghirxi’s adapted HFACS framework and the corresponding taxonomy
in the domain of accidents involving CDG was tested in this research. The testing
result is positive when the scope is limited to shipping company. However it is
doubtful when the scope is expanded to the shipper. Based on the collected data of
this research, the HFACS tool is not able to draw both shipping company and the
shipper into one conceptual framework. The reason of it has been discussed in the
paper.

The relationship between the theoretical model and supporting database is interactive.
The utility of the model is limited by the shortage of data in the real world. In the
context of accidents involving CDG, the utility of HFACS framework is also limited
by the insufficient investigation reports. The human factors retrieved from the
investigation reports were not able to reveal any meaningful trends, especially those
associated with the shipper. This is mainly because of the insufficiency of the
investigation.
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It has been proved by this research that the shipper of CDG plays a very important
role in containership accident. Thus, it is important to examine the reasons which
prevent the shipper from achieving safety goals in maritime domain. To fulfill this
objective, specific theoretical model and database are necessary of being created to
guide the future investigation and study.

There are two other available data sources related to incidents involving CDG apart
from the collected investigation reports in this research. One is the inspection data
coming from Container Inspection Programme launched by IMO since 1996 among
its member States. The other is Hazardous Material Incident Reporting System
(HMIRS) operated by Department of Transportation, U.S. Are there methods
available to qualify the reliability of such data? What is the difference between data
contained in the investigation reports and those provided in such sources? These
raised questions are waiting to be answered by the future research.
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Appendix 1
Fire/explosion accidents emanating from container cargo areas
in 1990-2009 periods
Ship name
Ever Group
Neptune Ruby
Bay of Bengal
Glorious Ocean
Tokyo Senator
President Washington
Contship Asia
Norasia Susan
California Luna
Contship Pacific
Contship France
Sealand mariner
Aconagua
DG Harmony
Wong On No.1
CMA Djakarta
Ever Decent
Uni Winner
Saudi Jeddah
Contship Champion
Choyang Success
CMA CGM Puget
Kitano
Wan Hai 161
Hanjin Pennsylvania
Sloman Traveller
Ara J.
LT Grand
LT Utile
Sea Elegance
MSC Paraguay
Csav Itajai

Flag
Taiwan
Singapore
Singapore
Panama
Germany
U.S.A.
Germany
Germany
Panama
Germany
Germany
Marshall Islands
Germany
Isle of Man
HongKong
Antigua & Barbuda
Panama
Panama
Bahamas
Germany
Panama
Panama
Japan
Taiwan
Liberia
Antigua & Barbuda
Antigua & Barbuda
Italy
Panama
Singapore
Panama
Marshall Islands

1

Accident date
1990-6-14
1991-3-31
1991-3-31
1992-4-17
1994-4-28
1994-5-7
1994-6-9
1994-6-12
1995-4-16
1996-7-24
1997-10-15
1998-4-18
1998-6-20
1998-11-9
1999-5-25
1999-7-10
1999-8-23
2000-6-9
2000-6-11
2000-6-24
2000-9-19
2000-9-19
2001-3-22
2001-7-18
2002-11-11
2003-1-12
2003-1-22
2003-2-17
2003-8-3
2003-10-11
2003-12-12
2004-2-28

NYK Argus
Glory Bridge
Punjab Senator
Norasia Taurus
Pac Makassar
Horizon Navigator
MOL Renaissance
Hyundai Fortune
YM Green
YM Comfort
Zim Haifa
CMA CGM Fidelio
MSC Roma
Chastine Maersk
Montreal Senator
APL Peru
Maersk Itea
Tini From
YM Union
Hyundai Long Beach
Iran Ilam
MOL Prosperity
MSC Ines

Panama
Liberia
Germany
Antigua & Barbuda
Singapore
U.S.A.
Liberia
Panama
Liberia
Taiwan
Israel
France
Liberia
Denmark
Cyprus
Antigua & Barbuda
Liberia
Antigua & Barbuda
Liberia
U.K.
Iran
Panama
Panama

2004-10-19
2005-3-14
2005-6-2
2005-7-16
2005-8-5
2005-8-12
2005-12-29
2006-3-21
2006-8-6
2007-3-10
2007-7-2
2007-7-4
2008-3-9
2008-8-13
2008-8-27
2008-10-8
2008-11-3
2008-11-27
2008-12-2
2009-2-5
2009-2-5
2009-7-2
2009-7-15

Total 55 accidents in 1990-2009 periods
Source: data retrieved from Lloyd’s MIU casualty database and English publications from

maritime accident investigation website of different countries
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Appendix 2
Coding of Human factor retrieved from investigation reports

Only factors within the scope of shipping company which is regarded as the main
organization to be analyzed will be retrieved from the reports. The other human
factors contained in the reports will be discussed in the remarks such as the unsafe
acts by the shipper or the maintenance organization.

The “MOR U.K.” accident
(Source: retrieved from:
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/marine/1995/index.asp)

No human contributing factor revealed.
(Remark: there is one contributing factor of shipper indentified by the report. That is
the suspect tank containing between 20 and 80 percent of their capacity should not
offered for transport by ship. But the information provided in the report is not enough
to trace other contributing factors back to the higher level of category. )

The “SEALAND MARINER” accident
(Source: retrieved from:
http://www.register-iri.com/content/maritimese/investigationreports.cfm)

UNSAFE ACTS:
AE 103 FAILURE TO SEE AND AVOID
The stowage planner of the charterer failed to perceive the undeclared dangerous

1

cargoes listed in the shipping paper, and mistakenly stowed them into cargo hold
without ventilation which is contrary to the Code.

AE 201 RISK ASSESSMENT DURING OPERATION
The maintenance team failed to adequately evaluate the explosive risks associated
with the hot work around the container. The concentration of explosive gas in the
No.7 hold emanating from the dangerous cargoes container is not detected by the
crew, and finally ignited by the falling hot slag.

PRECONDITIONS:
PE 205 BARRIERS
The placarding and marking of the container and the declaration of the dangerous
cargo are regarded as preventive barriers. In this case, the shipper not declaring the
dangerous cargo is regarded as a failed barrier.

SUPERVISION:
SI 001 LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION/OVERSIGHT INADEQUATE
The chief mate failed to review the cargo documents for possible oversight on the
part of the person preparing the documents (the stowage planner of the charterer).

SI 004 SUPERVISION-POLICY
Lacking of enough policy on guiding the hot work around the container area on
board ships contributes to the ignorance of the maintenance crew, despite that several
studies have shown that shippers do not always follow IMDG guidelines when
packing containers, and as a result, the atmosphere in or around the container may
present an unexpected explosive or flammable environment.

2

SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL
DATA OR PROCEDURES
The current technical information related to the risk of container cargoes, especially
dangerous containers, is not provided to the master and chief mate early enough
before departure by the charterer.

(Remark: There are three contributing factors with regard to the shipper. One is
failing to properly declare and document the hazard class on the shipping papers
presented to the vessel`s agent; The second is failing to mark and placard the
container; The last is failing to pack the cargo in accordance with the IMDG Code
requirements. But the information provided in the report is not enough to trace other
contributing factors back to the higher level of category.)

The “WING ON NO.1” accident
(Source: retrieved from: http://www.mardep.gov.hk/en/publication/ereport.html)

UNSAFE ACTS:
AE 103 FAILURE TO SEE AND AVOID
The stowage planner of the company failed to perceive the risk of hydrogen
explosion, thus not provide ventilation to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen.

SUPERVISION:
SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL
DATA OR PROCEDURES
The current technical information related to the dangerous cargo manifest is not
possessed by the crew causing the non-awareness of the risk existing currently.

3

ORGANIZATION:
OR 003 TRAINING
As revealed in the latter investigation report on the regulatory scheme of this issue, it
was found that little has been done in providing or facilitating the provision of
practical training to operators and workers on the safety precautions and safe
working practices.

FS 001 RULE-MAKING PROCESS
The later investigation report on the regulatory scheme on this issue revealed that the
existing legislation is inadequate in regulating the conveyance of used motor
vehicles/cycles and their spare parts. It further addressed that the deterrence from the
safety guidelines for the transport of motor vehicles/cycles is insufficient and too
indirect.

The “KITANO” accident
(Source: retrieved from:
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/marine/2001/index.asp)

(Remark: There is no cause and contributing factors identified in this accident
investigation. The main reason is that the source of ignition could not be identified
even though the source of fire has been identified as “activiated carbon pellet
impregnated with potassium hydroxide (caustic potash)”. The investigation further
explained that “in spite of the fact that the carbon pellets showed signs of self
heating”, they were not required to be classified as a class 4.2, packing group III
cargo, because they were transported in package with a volume of not more than 3
squre meters.”)

4

The “SEA ELEGANCE” accident
(Source: DSC 10/INF.2, retrieved from IMO document website)

UNSAFE ACTS:
AE 103 FAILURE TO SEE AND AVOID
The stowage planner of shipping company failed to perceive the undeclared cargo,
“Calcium Hypochlotire”, and mistakenly stowed it on the bottom tier, against the
port H.O. service tank, with the engine room bulkhead in the front which are contrary
to the Code.

PRECONDITION:
PE 205 BARRIERS
The placarding and labeling on the container and the declaration on the dangerous
cargo document are regarded as preventive barriers. In this case, the shipper not
declaring the dangerous cargo is regarded as failed barrier.

SUPERVISION:
SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL
DATA OR PROCEDURES
After the accident happened, it took the ship more than 24 hours to present a full
manifest of all cargo to the authority. This proved itself that the shipping company, in
her organizational level, failed to provide adequate information of cargo which is
necessary for the fire mitigation.

ORGANIZATION:
FS 001 RULE-MAKING PROCESS
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After a number of incidents with Calcium Hypochlorite, the Salvage Association and
the International Group of P&I Clubs issued pertinent recommendations, which
addressed higher risks of carrying Calcium Hypochlorite than IMDG Code does.
Plus, Recommendations of this investigation report has suggested that the IMO DSC
sub-committee should be asked to further investigate the carriage requirements of
Calcium Hypochlorite and amend the IMDG Code as appropriate. The serious
thought should be given to carry Calcium Hypochlorite in refrigerated containers,
specially where the transit takes place in or through the tropics, which addressed
higher risk of carriage of Calcium Hypochlorite in or through the tropics than IMDG
Code does.

(Remark: One contributing factor that the dangerous cargo is not declared by the
shipper is identified, But the information provided in the report is not enough to trace
other contributing factors back to the higher level of category)

The “LT UTILE” accident
(Source: retrieved from China Maritime Safety Administration)

No human factor revealed in the report.
(Remark: Even though the source of fire is identified, but the source of ignition is not
because the whole cargo and container are destroyed by the fire, resulting in no proof
to testify the contributing factor to the fire. But the investigator tried to identify the
risk of self ignition of subject cargo especially when contacting with reducer agent
surrounding it after leaking from the collapsed package during long time
transportation.)
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The “CSAV ITAJAI” accident
(Source: DSC 10/INF.2 , retrieved from IMO document website)

UNSAFE ACTS:
AE 103 FAILURE TO SEE OR AVOID
The stowage planner failed to perceive and react to the situation that the subject
container was stowed under deck (contrary to IMDG Code requirements), which
contains the temperature sensitive cargo inside. To make the situation even worse,
the container is put adjacent to the engine room.

PRECONDITIONS:
PE 202 AUTOMATION
Reliance was placed on a computer program/disc input to highlight the problematic
stowage, but the system failed to indicate the UN3341 Thiourea Dioxide requires “on
deck” category D stowage only.

SUPERVISION:
SI 001 LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION/OVERSIGHT INADEQUATE
The second physical check with the IMDG Code is overlooked by the captain since
the first electric check carried out has shown no alarm. The supervision and oversight
from shipping company and the captain was not enough to identify the stowage
hazard, and finally created the unsafe situation.

SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL
DATA OR PROCEDURES
After the accident happened, it took the ship more than 5 days to present the cargo
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manifest in No.6 hold to the authority. This proved itself that the shipping company,
in her organizational level, failed to provide adequate cargo information to master or
his representive in advance of loading, which maybe is necessary for proper stowage
and safe carriage of the cargo.

ORGANIZATION:
FS 001 RULE-MAKING PROCESS
It is recommended that further precautionary measures should be considered, by the
IMO DSC subcommittee, to control the temperature of “Thiourea Dioxide”
throughout the carriage process, like stowage away from radiant heat or for carriage
in reefer container or ventilation.

The “CMV PUNJAB SENATOR” accident
(Source: investigation report number:187/05, retrieved from the publication of the
website : http://www.bsu-bund.de/)

UNSAFE ACTS:
AE 103 FAILURES TO SEE OR AVOID
The stowage planner failed to perceive the situation that the rechargeable batteries
were stowed directly against the partition wall to the heavy oil settling tank in the
cargo hold 6 for 14 days, resulting in the high temperature of carriage.

PRECONDITIONS:
PE 214 CARGO SPACE SYSTEM KNOWLEDGE
The stowage planner has no knowledge about ship’s drawing, resulting in stowing
temperature sensitive rechargeable batteries against the partition wall to the heavy oil
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settling tank in the cargo hold no.6.

SUPERVISION:
SI 001 LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION/OVERSIGHT INADEQUATE
The supervision and oversight from shipping company and the captain was not
enough to identify the stowage hazard, and finally created the unsafe situation.

SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL
DATA OR PROCEDURES
The technical information, ship’s drawing of cargo hold no.6, related to the cargo
stowage is not provided to the charterer who is in charge of cargo stowage, resulting
in stowing temperature sensitive rechargeable batteries against the partition wall to
the heavy oil settling tank in the cargo hold no.6.

SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL
DATA OR PROCEDURES
The information related to subject cargo containers is not directed to the vessel’s
command, who thus failed to direct his attention to the risk resulting from the
mistaken stowage of the cargo.

ORGANIZATION:
OR 205 POOR SHIP DESIGN
The shipbuilding regulations should be reviewed in order to insulate cargo from
sources of heat due to vessel operations.

FS 001 RULE-MAKING PROCESS
It is recommended that further precautionary measures should be considered, by the
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IMO DSC subcommittee, to designate the NiMH rechargeable batteries as dangerous
cargo or cargo to be cooled.

The “KOTA PAHLAWAN” accident
(Source: retrieved from:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/safety-investigation-reports.aspx?mode=Marine)

ORGANIZATION:
FS 001 RULE-MAKING PROCESS
The ATSB has advised that xanthates have a recognized capacity to emit the odour of
carbon disulphide even when packaged in accordance with the IMDG Code and an
odour from xanthates shipments, similar to Kota Pahlawan`s, is commonplace
according to their Australian importers. This suggests that the information for
xanthates and requirements for their carriage, in particular the packaging, provided in
the Code is not enough to address the hazard, and thus should be reviewed.

(Remark:The xanthates carried by Kota Pahlawan were not hermetically sealed
strictly by the shipper in accordance with the IMDG Code. This is also regarded as
commonplace that an odour coming out in the packing industry according to the
investigation report. But the information provided in the report is not enough to trace
other contributing factors back to the higher level of category.)

The “DUTCH NAVIGATOR” accident
(Source: investigation report number: 37/2002, retrieved from:
http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2002/dutch_navigator.cf
m)
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UNSAFE ACTS:
AE 103 FAILURE TO SEE AND AVOID
The mate failed to be aware of the overstowage requirement from the IMDG Code
and relevant UK regulation, and ultimately overstowed the tank container on top of
each other.

AE 103 FAILURE TO SEE AND AVOID
The mate failed to see that excessive container stack masses has exceeded the
recommendation from the cargo securing manual, maybe resulting in the excessive
racking load.

SUPERVISION:
SI 001 LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION/OVERSIGHT INADEQUATE
Master failed to recognize the overstowage by the mate of the tank container on top
of each other.

SI 001 LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION/OVERSIGHT INADEQUATE
Master failed to recognize the excessive container stack masses, maybe resulting in
the excessive racking load.

SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE

CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL

DATA OR PROCEDURES
It is found during investigation that the UK regulation relevant to the dangerous
cargoes carriage was not provided on board ship.
(Remark: The framework and the liner integrity of the tank container were impaired
due to the improper repair by the maintenance organization, contributing to the
collapse of the framework and the leakage of the content. But the information

11

provided in the report is not enough to trace other contributing factors back to the
higher level of category.)

The “CMA CGM Fidelto” accident
(Source: retrieved from China Maritime Safety Administration)

No human factor revealed in the report.
(Remark: the investigation did not reveal the causes of the explosion, and failed to
trace back to other higher level human contributing factors. )

The “Hanjin London” accident
(Source: investigation report number:304/06, retrieved from the publication of the
website : http://www.bsu-bund.de/)

No human factor revealed in the report.
(Remark: the primary cause of the accident was no longer possible to be identified by
the investigation.)
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Ghirxi’s Adapted HFACS Framework and Taxonomy
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Nanocodes for Phase I of the Research Study

Adapted from the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)

Guidelines for Accident Report Rating
in the use of a modified
for Ships’ Machinery Space Fires and Explosions

i

The Concept of Performance Variability:
Investigating Fires & Explosions in Ships’ Machinery Spaces

Version 1.5
06/05/2007

UNSAFE ACTS

ii

The Concept of Performance Variability:
Investigating Fires & Explosions in Ships’ Machinery Spaces

Version 1.5
06/05/2007

iii
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Version 1.5
06/05/2007

UNSAFE ACTS
Acts: Factors that have happened on board the vessel where the accident/incident has
happened. Acts are active actions committed by the crew members, resulting in an
error or an unsafe situation. Acts are not limited to marine engineers, irrespective of
whether they form part of an engine-room watch system.
ERRORS: Factors in a mishap when mental or physical activities of the crew members
fail to achieve their intended outcome as a result of skill-based, perceptual, or
judgement and decision making errors leading to an unsafe situation. Errors are
unintended. AE xxx
Skill-based errors (AE 100) – Factors in a mishap when errors occur in the crew
member’s execution of a routine, highly practiced (automated) task relating to
procedure, training or proficiency and result in an unsafe situation.
AE 101

AE 102

AE 103
AE 104
AE 105
AE 106

AE 107

AE 108
AE 109

AE 110
AE 111
AE 112

iv

A factor when the individual’s movements inadvertently activate or
deactivate equipment, controls or switches when there is no intent to
operate the control or device. This action may be noticed or unnoticed by
the individual.
A factor when the individual fails to achieve his intentions because it is
expected that a considerable number of cues be processed in a critical time
period.
A factor when an individual fails to perceive and react to a situation,
resulting in an undesired outcome.
A factor when an individual inadvertently fails to render the necessary
attention to a particular detail due to the unfolding situation.
A factor when an individual’s techniques fall short of expected engineering
techniques and good seamanship practices.
A factor when an individual responds inappropriately to conditions by
either over-controlling or under-controlling the machinery space system.
The error may be a result of preconditions or a temporary failure of
coordination.
A factor when an individual relies on automation to the extent that he is
unaware of the status of the system and is not able to deduce the corrective
action to mitigate the unfolding situation.
A factor when an individual aptitude reflects a regular negative overt
expression of one’s own personality.
A factor when the individual, through an act of omission or commission,
either makes a checklist error or fails to run an appropriate checklist and
this failure results in an unsafe situation.
A factor when the individual, misses critical step/s in a procedural activity
due to memory failures when acting under stress.
A factor when the individual does not make use of an established
procedure.
A factor when an individual inadvertently fails to prioritise attention due to
memory failures when acting under stress.
The Concept of Performance Variability:
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Decision and judgement errors (AE 200) – Factors in a mishap when behaviour or
actions of the individual proceed as intended yet the chosen plan proves inadequate to
achieve the desired end-state and results in an unsafe situation.
AE 201

AE 202
AE 203

AE 204
AE 205
AE 206

v

When the individual fails to adequately evaluate the risks associated with a
particular course of action and this faulty evaluation leads to inappropriate
decision and subsequent unsafe situation. This failure occurs in real-time
when formal risk-assessment procedures are not possible.
When the individual does not organise, based on accepted prioritisation
techniques, the tasks needed to manage the immediate situation.
When the individual takes the necessary action as dictated by the situation
but performs these actions too quickly and the rush in taking action leads to
an unsafe situation.
When the individual selects a course of action but elects to delay execution
of the actions and the delay leads to an unsafe situation.
When a caution or warning is perceived, understood but ignored by the
individual, leading to an unsafe situation.
When the individual, through faulty logic selects the wrong course of
action in a time-constrained environment.
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Perceptual errors (AE 300) – Factors in a mishap when misperception of an object,
threat or situation (such as visual, auditory, proprioceptive, or vestibular illusions,
cognitive or attention failures) results in human error.
AE 301

AE 302

vi

When the individual acts or fails to act based on an illusion, misperception
or disorientation state and this act or failure to act creates an unsafe
situation.
When an individual acts or fails to act appropriately due to degraded or
unusual sensory input, leaving the individual to make a decision based on
faulty information. It is the crew member’s response to the illusion or
disorientation that is classified as a perceptual error and not the illusion or
disorientation per se.
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VIOLATIONS: Factors in a mishap when the actions of the operator represent wilful
disregard for rules and instructions and lead to an unsafe situation. AV xxx
Routine violations (AV 400) – Factors in a mishap when violations are committed by
crew members in a habitual manner and are often tolerated by line and organisational
management.
AV 401

AV 402
AV 403

AV 404

AV 405

AV 406

AV 407

vii

A factor when the consequences/risk of violating published procedures
were recognised, consciously assessed and honestly determined by the
individual or crew to be the best course of action. Routine “work-arounds”
and unofficial procedures that are accepted by the organisation on board as
necessary for operations are also captured under this code.
A factor when a crew member carries out a routine job without the
adequate familiarisation required in the SMS of the company.
A factor when a crew member wilfully operates or maintains a piece of
equipment or auxiliary machinery without the necessary consent required
by the SMS of the company. Consent may either be written in the form of
permits of verbal instructions.
A factor when a crew member wilfully operates or maintains a piece of
equipment or auxiliary machinery without being provided with the
necessary theoretical and practical training.
A factor when a crew member wilfully operates or maintains a piece of
equipment or auxiliary machinery without observing the instructions
provided in the manufacturer’s manual.
A factor when a crew member wilfully operates or maintains a piece of
equipment or auxiliary machinery without observing machinery space
standing orders and regulations.
A factor when following an alarm, a crew member wilfully fails to take
corrective or remedial actions to safeguard the operation of the equipment
or auxiliary machinery.
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Exceptional violations (AV 500) – Factors in a mishap when violations have been
committed in exceptional circumstances. These violations neither reflect the typical
character of the crew member nor are condoned by the management of the vessel.
Violations are exceptional not because they are extreme in nature but because they do
not represent the typical behaviour of the crew member.
AV 501
AV 502
AV 503
AV 504

viii

A factor when the wilful actions or inactions of the crew member result in
the system operating beyond its limits.
A factor when a crew member wilfully accepts unnecessary hazards to
create an unsafe situation.
A factor when a crew member takes over an machinery space watch
without being qualified in accordance with the flag State regulations.
A factor when the crew member wilfully sets the system to operate beyond
its design parameters.
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PRECONDITIONS
FOR UNSAFE ACTS
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PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS
Preconditions: Factors in a mishap if active and/or latent preconditions such as
conditions of the operators, environmental or personnel factors affect practices,
conditions or actions of individuals and result in human error or an unsafe situation.
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS: Factors in a mishap if physical or technological
factors affect practices, conditions and actions of individual and result in human error
or an unsafe situation. PE xxx
Physical environment (PE 100) – Factors in a mishap if environmental phenomena
such as weather and climate affect the actions of individuals and result in human error
or an unsafe situation.
PE 101
PE 102
PE 103
PE 104
PE 105

PE 106

xi

A factor when the individual is exposed to heat resulting in compromised
function, or interferes with the normal performance of duties.
A factor when the absence, pattern, intensity or location of the light fitting
prevents or interferes with safe task accomplishment.
A factor when the intensity or duration is sufficient to adversely affect safe
task accomplishment.
A factor when acceleration forces or manoeuvres cause or contribute to
damage, injury, prevent or interfere with the performance of normal duties.
A factor when either exposure to chemical agents, fumes, fuels or oils is
severe and interferes with the normal performance of normal duties or else
machinery space lack of cleanliness contributes to the spread/intensity of a
fire.
A factor when any noise not directly related to the information needed for
task accomplishment interferes with the individual’s ability to perform that
task.

The Concept of Performance Variability:
Investigating Fires & Explosions in Ships’ Machinery Spaces

Version 1.5
06/05/2007

Technological environment (PE 200) – Factors in a mishap if machinery space,
engine control room and workshop design factors, automation or technical
procedural/drawings affect the actions of individuals and result in human error or
unsafe situation.
PE 201

PE 202
PE 203
PE 204

PE 205

PE 206

PE 207
PE 208

PE 209

PE 210

PE 211
PE 212
PE 213

PE 214

xii

A factor when the location, shape, size, design, reliability, lighting or other
aspect of a control or switch is inadequate and this leads to an unsafe
situation.
A factor when the design, function, reliability, use guidance, symbology,
logic or other aspect of automated systems creates an unsafe situation.
A factor when the design of machinery and layout has an adverse impact on
the individual’s performance.
A factor when communication equipment is inadequate or unavailable to
support machinery space job demands. This includes electronically or
physically blocked transmissions. Communications can be voice, data or
multi-sensory.
A factor when other physical, functional and symbolic barriers are missing
or inadequate, lead to an unsafe situation. Barriers functions captured
include active, passive, preventive and reactive.
A factor when the equipment is unsafe, directly leading to an unsafe
situation or else may cause an individual to become distracted from the task
due to concern for personal safety.
A factor when the tools used are unsuitable or inadequate for the task
performed and this leads to an unsafe situation.
A factor when the fault isolation and detection is difficult, installation is
error prone, multiple similar connections exist on the system or different
sized fasteners can be installed in multiple locations, which can lead to an
unsafe situation.
A factor when it is a real contributor rather than an inconvenience. In such
cases, the components or area to be maintained is surrounded by structure,
no access doors exist in the maintenance area, there is a lack of footing
space or handholds or the area is small or odd-shaped.
A factor when similar parts on different machinery are installed differently,
thereby leading to an unsafe act. This also applies to different machinery
fitted on different ships.
A factor when the part or tool is not owned or not in stock on board or is
not available for procurement, even if the ship remains seaworthy.
A factor when the hand marked labelling is incorrect or a wrong part
number on the part leads to the selection of the incorrect part.
A factor when the part can be easily installed with wrong orientation, there
are no orientation indicators or connections are identical in size, colour or
length, leading to an unsafe situation.
A factor when the individual has no knowledge of the machinery space
schematics and line/electrical installations.
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PE 215

PE 216

PE 217

PE 218

PE 219

PE 220

xiii

A factor when the individual finds the information provided problematic
due to unfamiliar words, non-standard format, poor or insufficient
illustrations, lack of detail or missing steps and poor writings, leading to an
unsafe situation.
A factor when a procedure does not exist, not located in a correct or usual
place or near the worksite in the machinery space, leading to an unsafe
situation.
A factor when the individual finds that a procedure has missing pages, not
revised, does not match machinery configuration, transferred from the
source document incorrectly, steps are out of sequence or procedure does
not work, leading to an unsafe situation.
A factor when the individual finds similar procedures in different resources,
which do not agree, too many references to other documents and
configurations shown in different resources do not agree, leading to an
unsafe situation.
A factor when the individual uses procedures, which have been revised but
not incorporated in the SMS, service bulletins by the maker not included in
the SMS and document change requests are not submitted, lost or
incorrectly filled, leading to an unsafe situation.
A factor when the individual uses the procedures, which do not meet the
intent of the manufacturer’s procedures, non-standard steps or practices are
added and the format does not match the rest of the procedure or
procedures.
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CREW CONDITION: Factors in a mishap if cognitive, psycho-behavioural, adverse
physical state, or physical/mental limitations affect practices, conditions or actions of
individuals and result in human error or an unsafe situation.
PC xxx
Cognitive factors (PC 100) – Factors in a mishap if cognitive or attention
management conditions affect the perception or performance of individuals and result
in human error or an unsafe situation.
PC 101

PC 102

PC 103

PC 104

PC 105

PC 106
PC 107

PC 108

PC 109
PC 110

PC 111
PC 112
PC 113

xiv

A factor when the individual has a state of reduction conscious attention
due to a sense of security, self-confidence, boredom or a perceived absence
of threat from the environment which degrades crew performance.
A factor when the individual is focusing all conscious attention on a limited
number of environmental cues to the exclusion of others of a subjectively
equal or higher or more immediate priority, leading to an unsafe situation.
A factor when the individual is unable to maintain a cohesive and orderly
awareness of events and required actions and experiences a state
characterised by bewilderment, lack of clear thinking, or (sometimes)
disorientation.
A factor when the individual has an interruption of attention and/or
inappropriate redirection of attention by an environmental cue or mental
process that degrades performance.
A factor when an individual is performing a highly automated/learned task
and is distracted by another cue/event that results in the interruption and
subsequent failure to complete the original task or results in skipping steps
in the original task.
A factor when the individual is under the influence of a strong positive or
negative emotion and that emotion interferes with duties.
A factor when the individual’s personal interaction with others creates an
unsafe situation. Examples are authoritarian, over-conservative, impulsive,
invulnerable, and submissive or other personal traits that result in degraded
crew performance.
A factor when the individual over-values or over-estimates personal
capability, the capability of others or the capability of the machinery or
equipment and this creates an unsafe situation.
A factor when the individual knowingly commits to a course of action that
presses oneself and/or one’s equipment beyond reasonable limits.
A factor when the individual’s state of reduced conscious attention due to
an attitude of overconfidence, undermotivation or the sense that others
“have the situation under control” leads to an unsafe situation.
A factor when an individual or crew is excessive in the manner in which
one conducts a mission.
A factor when the individual is preoccupied with success to the exclusion
of other factors leading to an unsafe situation.
A factor when an individual or crew is motivated to complete a task for
personal reasons, thereby short cutting necessary procedures or exercising
poor judgement, leading to an unsafe situation.
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PC 114

PC 115

PC 116

PC 117

PC 118

PC 119
PC 120

PC 121

PC 122

PC 123
PC 124

PC 125

PC 126

1

xv

A factor when the individual has a cognitive or mental framework of
expectations that predispose oneself to a certain course of action, regardless
of other cues.
Also known as motivational exhaustion. A factor when the individual has
the type of exhaustion associated with the wearing effects of high
operations and personal tempo where one’s operational requirements
impinge on the ability to satisfy personal requirements and leads to
degraded cognitive or operational capability.
A factor when the individual’s diminished mental capability is due to an
inadequate recovery, as a result of restricted or shortened sleep or physical
or mental activity during prolonged wakefulness. Fatigue may additionally
be described as acute, cumulative or chronic.
A factor when the individual’s normal, 24-hour rhythmic biological cycle
(circadian rhythm) is disturbed and degrades task performance. This is
caused typically by night work or rapid movement (such as one time zone
per hour) across several time zones.
A factor when an individual misperceives or misjudges weight, volume,
pressure, temperature, viscosity, density, flow rate and sea conditions
within the performance envelope or other operational conditions and this
leads to an unsafe situation.
A factor when the individual is presented with a correct instrument reading
but its significance is not recognised, it is misread or is misinterpreted.
A factor when the individual expects to perceive a certain reality and those
expectations are strong enough to create a false perception of the
expectation.
A factor when the auditory inputs are correctly interpreted but are
misleading or disorienting or when the inputs are incorrectly interpreted
and cause an impairment of normal performance.
A factor when the inputs other than auditory are correctly interpreted but
are misleading or disorienting or when the inputs are incorrectly interpreted
and cause an impairment of normal performance.
A factor when an individual exhibits lack of watchfulness and alertness
leading to an unsafe situation.
A factor when the individual is unwilling to use written information
because it is seen as lack of technical skills/knowledge or has lack of
individual confidence. In addition, this applies when the individuals do not
question other’s processes or does not follow safe operating procedures
because others do not follow them.
A factor when an individual was adequately exposed to the information
needed to perform the task but did not absorb it. Lack of knowledge in this
case implies no deficiency in the training programme, but rather the failure
of the individual to absorb or retain the information1.
A factor when the individual reverts to highly learned behaviour used in
previous situation but response is inappropriate or degrades performance.

Exposure to information at a point in the past does not imply “knowledge” of it.
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Physiological state (PC 200) – Factors in a mishap if the functioning of the body,
including the physical and chemical process of cells, tissues, organs and systems and
their various interaction is abnormal, resulting into a general or specific impairment,
which leads to an individual making an error or leading to an unsafe act.
PC 201

PC 202

PC 203
PC 204
PC 205

PC 206
PC 207
PC 208

PC 209
PC 210
PC 211

PC 212
PC 213

2

3

A factor when the individual takes a pharmaceutical intervention,
prescribed or otherwise, that interferes with performance2. The effects may
be direct or residual.
A factor when due to an injury sustained during the job or a physical
condition such as headaches and chronic pain, the senses and the ability to
concentrate are affected and the time to react increases, resulting in a
degradation of performance.
A factor when the individual suffers abnormal loss of awareness of the self
and of one’s surroundings, resulting in an unsafe situation.
A factor when the individual’s diminished physical activity is due to
overuse (time/relative load) during the job, degrading task performance3.
A factor when the symptoms of seasickness impair normal performance.
Seasickness includes, nausea, sweating, flushing, headache, stomach
awareness, malaise and vomiting.
A factor when the individual has insufficient oxygen supply to the body
leading to an impairment of function.
A factor when the effect of ventilating above the physiological demands of
the body causes the individual’s performance capabilities to be degraded.
A factor when the performance of the individual is degraded due to
dehydration as a result of excessive fluid losses due to insufficient fluid
intake.
A factor when the number or complexity of manual tasks in a compressed
time period exceeds an individual’s capacity to perform.
A factor when the acute or residual effects of alcohol or drug overdose
impair performance or create an unsafe situation.
A factor when the individual’s nutritional state or poor dietary practices are
inadequate to fuel the brain and body functions resulting in degraded
performance.
A factor when the opportunity to rest was provided but the individual failed
to take the opportunity to rest.
A factor when the individual intentionally operates machinery or engages
in maintenance tasks with a known disqualifying medical condition that
results in an unsafe situation.

This includes nicotine or caffeine in sufficient quantities to cause impairment of normal function.
This also includes chemical compound taken for purposes of prevention of disease, treatment of
disease, weight management, mood alteration, birth control or sleep management etc.
The effects of prolonged physical activity, or the effects of brief but relatively extreme physical
activity, of which takes either an individual’s physical endurance or strength beyond the individual’s
normal limits.
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PC 214

PC 215
PC 216
PC 217

PC 218
PC 219

xvii

A factor when the relative physical state of the individual, in terms of a
regular rigorous exercise programme or a physical active lifestyle, is not
adequate to support machinery space demands.
A factor when an individual replaces the primary goal of a task with a
personal goal.
A factor when the individual’s motivation to accomplish a task is weak or
indecisive.
A factor when a qualified crew member has physical problems either before
joining the vessel or during his engagement on board but before the
occurrence of the mishap.
A factor when the individual lacks the required psychomotor skills,
coordination or timing skills necessary to accomplish the task attempted.
A factor when the individual is required to respond quickly but the reaction
time available to process all the possibilities or choices thoroughly is
critically short and exceeds one’s ability.
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PERSONNEL FACTORS: Factors in a mishap if self-imposed stressors or crew
resource management affect practices, conditions or actions of individuals and result
in human error or an unsafe situation. PP xxx
Crew interaction (PP 100) – Factors in a mishap if poor communication skills and
team coordination affect the perception or performance of individuals and result in
human error or an unsafe situation.
PP 101

PP 102
PP 103
PP 104

PP 105
PP 106
PP 107

PP 108

PP 109

PP 110

PP 111

4

A factor when the machinery space leadership techniques failed to facilitate
a proper crew climate, to include the establishment and the maintenance of
an accurate and shared understanding of the evolving voyage and plan on
the part of all crew members.
A factor when crew or team members failed to monitor, assist or back-up
each other’s actions and decisions4.
A factor when the crew members failed to actively manage the distribution
of mission tasks to prevent the overloading of any crew member.
A factor when the difference in rank of the machinery space staff or ship
caused the crew performance capabilities to be degraded. In addition, this
applies to conditions where formal or informal authority gradient is too
steep or too flat across a crew and this condition degrades collective or
individual performance.
A factor when individuals failed to state critical information or solutions
with appropriate persistence.
A factor when known critical information was not provided to appropriate
individuals in an accurate or timely manner.
A factor when communications did not include supportive feedback or
acknowledgement to ensure that crew members correctly understood
announcements or directives.
A factor when an individual or crew member failed to complete all
preparatory tasks associated with planning the job, resulting in an unsafe
situation. Planning the job includes information collection and analysis,
coordinating activities within the crew and with appropriate external
agencies, contingency planning, and risk assessment.
A factor when information and instructions provided to individuals, crews,
or teams were insufficient, or participants failed to discuss maintenance
jobs and strategies to cope with contingencies.
A factor when crew members fail to adequately reassess changes in their
dynamic environment during job execution and change their task plans
accordingly to ensure adequate management of risk.
A factor when correctly communicated information is misunderstood,
misinterpreted, or disregarded.

Factor ‘PP102’ captures situations where ‘team stability’ collapses in the face of an emergency
leading to chaos.
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Personal readiness (PP 200) – Factors in a mishap if the crew member demonstrates
disregard for rules and instructions that govern the individuals readiness to perform,
or exhibits poor judgement when it comes to readiness and results in human error or
an unsafe situation. This does not only include personal readiness failures because
rules or regulations have been broken.
PP 201
PP 202
PP 203

PP 204

xix

A factor when inadequate familiarisation training leads to human error or
an unsafe situation.
A factor when job is performed by individual for the first time or job is
performed in the wrong sequence.
A factor when frequent work interruptions, failure to perform preparation
tasks first, too many tasks are scheduled for limited time period or task
necessary for safety is not performed first, leading to a human error or an
unsafe act.
A factor when the risk-evolution exercise neither offers an advise on each
of the identified hazards nor does it give a comprehensive judgement on
whether the entire system is safe enough.
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UNSAFE SUPERVISION
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UNSAFE SUPERVISION
Supervision: Factors in a mishap if the methods, decisions or policies of the
supervisory chain of command (officers at management level over operational and
support levels) directly affect practices, conditions, or actions of individual and result
in human error or an unsafe situation.
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION: Factors in a mishap when supervision proves
inappropriate or improper and fails to identify hazard, recognize and control risk,
provide guidance, training and/or oversight and results in human error or an unsafe
situation. SI xxx
Shipborne and shore supervision (SI 000) – Factors in a mishap when the interaction
between officers at management level and the ship’s ISM managers has a direct
bearing on the day-to-day running and operation of the machinery space, leading to an
unsafe situation.
SI 001

SI 002

SI 003

SI 004
SI 005

SI 006

SI 007

A factor when the availability, competency, quality, or timeliness of
leadership, supervision or oversight does not meet task demands and
creates an unsafe situation. Inappropriate supervisory pressures are also
captured under this code5.
A factor when the individual’s learning is influenced by the behaviour of
peers and supervisors and when the learning manifests itself in actions that
are either inappropriate to the individual’s skill level or violate standard
procedures and lead to an unsafe situation.
A factor when one-time or recurrent training programmes, upgrade
programmes, transition programmes or any other local training is
inadequate or unavailable (etc) and this creates an unsafe situation6.
A factor when policy, guidance, or lack of a policy on guidance leads to an
unsafe situation.
A factor when crew members at management, operational and/or support
levels experience a “personality conflict” that leads to a dangerous error in
judgement/action.
A factor when information critical to a potential safety issue had been
provided to officers at management level without feedback to the source
(e.g. DPA) i.e. failure to close the loop.
A factor when current technical information related to the running of the
machinery space or maintenance of machinery in the machinery space is
not provided to other crew members at management level and/or at
operational and support level leading to a dangerous error in
judgement/decision.

5

Factor ‘SI 001’ also captures lack of records on crew performance data.

6

The failure of an individual to absorb the training material in an adequate training programme does
not indicate a training programme problem. Capture these factors under ‘PC 125’. The failure of an
individual to recall learned information under stress or while fatigued despite attending an adequate
training programme does not indicate a training programme problem. Capture these factors under
‘PC 103’, ‘PC 104’ and ‘PC 126’.
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SI 008

SI 009

SI 010
SI 011

SI 012
SI 013

SI 014

SI 015

A factor when officers at management level do not distribute breaks
throughout work periods, particularly when things are routine, repetitive,
long and/or monotonous.
A factor when officers at management level do not make sure that crew
members at operation and support level successfully fulfil their assigned
responsibility.
A factor when the officers in management level are not assigned the
necessary resources to accomplish goals and objectives.
A factor when officers at management level do not track a crew member’s
qualifications, resulting in that individual serving in a particular capacity or
perform a particular function or task which is higher than that specified in
his document7.
A factor when realistic, understandable, measurable, and achievable
objectives are not set, leading to unclear and misunderstood objectives.
A factor when the officer at management level is either untrained or else
the situation demands exceed his ability to oversee the task performed by
the other officers.
A factor when for some reason other than lack of training and/or situation
demands, an officer at management level does not oversee the task
performed by other officers.
A factor when officers at management level do not communicate safety
critical information to the company representatives, leading to an unsafe
situation or a situation not tackled in an adequate manner8.

7

An individual signing on a vessel without the necessary documents that the STCW Convention
requires as evidence of having met (or achieved) all relevant Convention requirements, is also
captured under ‘SI 011’.

8

Company representatives refer to safety managers, superintendents and/or the DPA.
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PLANNED INAPPROPRIATE OPERATIONS: Factors in a mishap when supervision
fails to adequately assess the hazards associated with an operation and allows for
unnecessary risk. It is also a factor when supervision allows non-proficient or
inexperienced personnel to attempt tasks beyond their capability or when crew
complement is inappropriate for the task. SP xxx
Shipborne operations (SP 000) – Factors in a mishap when the interaction between
officers at management and operational levels and support levels has a direct bearing
on the day-to-day running and operation of the machinery space, leading to an unsafe
situation.
SP 001

SP 002

SP 003

SP 004

SP 005
SP 006

SP 007

SP 008
SP 009
SP 010

9

A factor when an officer at management level directs crew members to
undertake a task beyond their skill level or beyond the capabilities of their
equipment.
A factor when the interaction of senior officers at management level and
junior crew members at operation and support levels leads to poor
communication and coordination problems.
A factor when the officer at management level selects an individual who’s
experience for either a specific task, event or scenario is not sufficiently
current to permit safe task execution.
A factor when an officer at management level selects an individual who has
either infrequently or rarely performed a task, or participated in a specific
scenario.
A factor when an individual is not proficient in a task or event.
A factor when an officer at management level does not adequately evaluate
the risks associated with a task or when pre-task risk assessment tools or
risk assessment programmes are inadequate.
A factor when management level authorises a task or a task element that is
unnecessarily hazardous without sufficient cause or need. In addition, it
includes unintentional scheduling of crew members for a task that they are
not qualified to perform.
A factor when due to the prevailing circumstances, offices at management
level do not brief and/or supervise the subordinates.
A factor when due to the prevailing circumstances management does not
provide an opportunity for crew rest9.
A factor when due to the prevailing circumstances management authorises
tasks and workload in excess of the capability of the individual.

Factor ‘SP 009’ captures instances during emergency operations, as compared to rest periods captures under ‘SI
008’.
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FAILED TO CORRECT KNOWN PROBLEMS: Factors in a mishap when officers at
management level fail to correct known deficiencies in documents, processes or
procedures, or fail to correct inappropriate or unsafe actions of individuals, and this
lack of supervisory action creates an unsafe situation. SF xxx
Shipborne shortcomings (SF 000) – Factors in a mishap when officers at management
level do not comply with safety management practices, leading to an unsafe situation.
SF 001

SF 002
SF 003
SF 004

SF 005

SF 006

xxv

A factor when officers at management level fail to identify a crew member
at operation or support level who exhibits recognisable risky behaviour or
unsafe tendencies or fail to institute remedial actions when an individual is
identified with risky behaviours or unsafe tendencies.
A factor when officers at management level fail to correct a safety hazard
or factors which might trigger off an accident.
A factor when, following a safety analysis, decisions on corrective actions
are not implemented.
A factor when officers at management level fail to correct known
hazardous practices, conditions or guidance that allow for hazardous
practices within the scope of one’s command.
A factor when revised procedures have not been incorporated in the SMS,
service bulletins by the maker not included in the SMS and document
change made by the company are lost or incorrectly filed, leading to an
unsafe situation.
A factor when due to lack of management level oversight in the stock
taking of spare parts or tools, hand marked labelling is incorrect or a wrong
part number on the part leads to the selection of the incorrect part.
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SUPERVISORY VIOLATIONS: Factors in a mishap when officers at management
level wilfully disregards instructions, guidance, rules, or operating instructions whilst
managing organisational assets and this lack of supervisory responsibly creates an
unsafe situation. SV xxx
Shipborne violations (SV 000) – Factors in a mishap when violations committed by
the operating and support level machinery space crew members are tolerated by
officers at management level, leading to an unsafe situation.
SV 001

SV 002
SV 003

SV 004

SV 005

SV 006

10

A factor when a master inappropriately signs-on an individual on board his
ship even though he is aware that the individual does not possess the
necessary documents or has not met the necessary qualifications prescribed
in the STCW Convention or the national requirements of the flag State of
the ship.
A factor when organisational and operating rules have not been enforced by
the normally constituted authority.
A factor when an officer at management level directs an officer at operation
level and/or a crew member at support level to infringe existing regulations,
instructions or technical guidance.
A factor when an officer at management level directs another crew member
to carry out a task, which does not necessarily violate a written procedure
but nonetheless goes against established seamanship practices.
A factor when rather than following formally established and constituted
authority, an individual at management level follows unwritten and
unofficial policy, which leads to an unsafe situation or else wilfully
encourages disregard of authority in his subordinates10.
A factor when officers at management level allows for the use of
inadequate/obsolete instructions or technical guidance.

Factor ‘SV 005’ is very closely related to factors captured under ‘OC 004’. Nonetheless, raters need
to distinguish between an officer following an unwritten instruction or an unofficial policy and an
officer exerting overriding authority, emanating from a resilient organisational system.

xxvi

The Concept of Performance Variability:
Investigating Fires & Explosions in Ships’ Machinery Spaces

Version 1.5
06/05/2007

ORGANISATIONAL
INFLUENCES
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ORGANISATIONAL INFLUENCES
Organisation: Factors in a mishap if the communications, actions omissions or
policies of upper-level management directly or indirectly affect supervisory practices,
conditions or actions of the crew member(s) and result in system failure, human error
or an unsafe situation.
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: Factors in a mishap if resource management (and/or
acquisition) processes or policies, directly or indirectly, influence system safety and
results in poor error management or creates an unsafe situation.
OR xxx
Human resources (OR 000) - Factors in a mishap when organisational decisionmaking regarding the allocation and maintenance of human resources results in
human error or an unsafe situation.
OR 001

OR 002

OR 003

A factor when the process of safe manning or manning resource allocations
is inadequate for the voyage demands and the inadequacy causes an unsafe
situation or excessive stress on the remaining crew members.
A factor when the process of engaging crew members, either directly or
through a manning agency, is inadequate for the voyage and/or company
demands and the inadequacy cause an unsafe situation11.
A factor when the process allows for the assigning of responsibility to a
crew member without the requisite training, resulting in an unsafe
situation12.

11

Factor ‘OR 001’ also captures situations where the engaging of multi-national crew members on
board a ship leads to the erection of language barriers, causing an unsafe situation.

12

Training captured under factor ‘OR 003’ has two components. The first component is the initial
training given to a crew member when he signs on a vessel i.e. the familiarisation training as required
by the ISM Code. The second component is the in-house training or other on-going training, such as
refresher courses, which is intended to keep the crew members abreast and fresh with the necessary
knowledge to operate in a safe manner on board the ship.
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Technological environment (OR 100) - Factors in a mishap when organisational
decision-making regarding the allocation and maintenance of monetary assets results
in human error or an unsafe situation.
OR 101

OR 102

xxx

A factor when excessive cost-cutting results in reduced funding for new
equipment, the purchase of low-cost, lack of quality replacement parts
and/or bunker oil.
A factor when the vessel does not receive indirect financial resources to
complete a task and/or allocation of training programmes is cut short and
this deficiency creates an unsafe situation.
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Equipment/facility resources (OR 200) - Factors in a mishap when organisational
decision-making and policies regarding the selection of particular designs, resources
and facilities result in human error or an unsafe situation.
OR 201
OR 202

OR 203
OR 204

OR 205

OR 206

OR 207
OR 208

OR 209

A factor when support facilities and opportunities for recreation/rest are not
available or adequate and this creates an unsafe situation13.
A factor when the processes through which the vessel, equipment,
machinery or logistical support are acquired allow inadequacies or when
design deficiencies allow inadequacies in the acquisition and the
inadequacies create an unsafe situation.
A factor when the process through which equipment is removed from
service is inadequate and this inadequacy creates an unsafe situation.
A factor when the process through which crew members and shore
personnel are screened, brought into the service, or placed into specialties,
is inadequate and creates an unsafe situation.
A factor when the design of the machinery space contributes directly to
either the initiation and/or propagation of an unsafe situation or else it does
not assist the crew member’s cognitive activities during the interception
and interpretation of the overall system cues and creates an unsafe
situation.
A factor when the design of a particular piece of machinery, control or
equipment contributes directly to the initiation and/or propagation of an
unsafe situation or else visual and/or aurally information provided to the
crew member is not presented clearly and properly and creates an unsafe
situation.
A factor when equipment is bought even if it does not meet internationally
agreed specifications.
A factor when design flaws which have been discovered in similar
equipment through assessments or investigations have not been corrected,
leading to an unsafe situation14.
A factor when tools either have not been made available on board or tools
made available are of poor design, awkward to use or pose difficulties to
the crew member, leading to an unsafe situation.

13

Factor ‘OR 201’ captures situations where leave from the vessel (signing off) is refused for reasons
other than the individual’s choice. Support facilities include dining, exercise, mess rooms, medical
care etc.

14

Factor ‘OR 208’ captures also design flaws, which have been discovered in other companies and
made public through accident and incident reports.
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ORGANISATIONAL PROCESS: Factors in a mishap if organisational processes such
as operations, procedures, operational risk management and oversight, negatively
influence individual, supervisory, and/or organisational performance and results in
unrecognised hazards and/or uncontrolled risk and leads to human error or an unsafe
situation.
OP xxx
Operations (OP 000) - Factors in a mishap when corporate decisions and rules that
govern the day-to-day activities within an organisation create an unsafe situation.
OP 001

OP 002

OP 003

OP 004

xxxii

A factor when the management company determines that it is necessary to
increase the operational tempo to a point that it overextends the machinery
space manning capabilities, leading to a human error or an unsafe situation.
A factor when the management company discontinues or inhibits incentive
(award) programmes, leading to under-reporting of hazards, incidents and
lack of active participation in safety meetings.
A factor when the management company allows for environmental
demands to exceed the available resources, leading to stress (physiological,
psychological, behavioural or social outcomes).
A factor when the officers at management level have to resort to inadequate
scheduling procedures that jeopardise crew rest or produce sub-optimal
crew interaction, putting crew members at an increased risk of a mishap.
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Procedures (OP 100) - Factors in a mishap when corporate decisions and rules that
govern the day-to-day use of standard operating procedures create an unsafe situation.
OP 101

OP 102

OP 103

OP 104

xxxiii

A factor when written procedures are found to be flawed or faulty, leading
to the application of non-standard procedures, resulting in the introduction
of unwanted variability into the maintenance operations.
A factor when the management company fails to establish or communicate
the objectives for goals or the objectives are unrealistic, not understandable,
immeasurable and unachievable, leading to misunderstanding by the crew
members.
A factor when written direction, checklists, graphic depictions, tables,
charts or other published guidance are inadequate, misleading or
inappropriate and this creates an unsafe situation.
A factor when weather, intelligence, operational planning material or other
information necessary for safe operations planning are not available,
leading to human error or an unsafe situation.
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Oversight (OP 200) - Factors in a mishap when corporate decisions and rules that
govern the use of formal methods for maintaining oversight between the crew
members and company management create an unsafe situation.
OP 201

OP 202

OP 203

15

A factor when the doctrine, philosophy or concept of operations in an
organisation is either flawed or accepts unnecessary risk and this flaw or
risk acceptance leads to an unsafe situation or uncontrolled hazard.
A factor when the company either does not have a safety/risk programme in
place as it is seen as an overhead and a non-productive value or has a
safety/risk programme without having an adequate understanding of the
problem or actions needed to resolve safety critical issues15.
A factor when companies are missing official procedures in place to
address contingencies and oversight programmes to monitor risks, leading
to unawareness of problems before an accident occurs.

Factor ‘OP 202’ also captures instances such as when the company orders a generic safety
management system manual and puts it on the shelf and/or when the management company blames a
crew member whenever an accident/incident happens on board the ship.
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ORGANISATIONAL CLIMATE: Factors in a mishap if organisational variables
including environment, structure, policies, and culture influence individual actions are
inadequate and result in human error or an unsafe situation. OC xxx
Structure (OC 000) - Factors in a mishap when the overall hierarchal structure of a
company creates an unsafe situation.
OC 001

OC 002

OC 003

OC 004

OC 005

A factor when the chain-of-command on board a ship or the management
structure of the managing company is confusing, non-standard or
inadequate and this creates an unsafe situation.
A factor when a breakdown in the transfer of information between the
managing company to the ship or between crew members results in correct
information not reaching the crew member in a timely manner, leading to a
human error or an unsafe situation.
A factor when the representatives16 of a managing company either is unable
to take the opportunity or else the opportunity does not exist to listen and
respond to crew members’ questions and comments, leading to an unsafe
situation.
A factor when the managing company undermines the authority and
interferes with the accountability of officers at management level,
preventing them from effectively carrying out their assigned
responsibilities, leading to an unsafe situation17.
A factor when the organisational structure does not include a specific
accountability system, whereby managers and officers in management level
are held accountable for the completion of assigned safety responsibilities
resulting in substandard performance and an unsafe situation.

16

Company representatives refer to safety managers, superintendents and/or designated persons ashore.

17

Factor ‘OC 004’ captures situations when the managing company fails to realise that company
procedures do not necessarily capture all situations and therefore under the prevailing situation, the
crew members at management level need to be allowed a certain degree of authority to override
established procedures in the interest of safety and pollution prevention.
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Policies (OC 100) - Factors in a mishap when ill-defined, adversarial, or conflicting
policies or supplanted by unofficial rules and values result in confusion and lead to
human error or an unsafe situation.
OC 101

OC 102
OC 103

OC 104

18

A factor when a crew member perceives that his/her performance on a task
will inappropriately influence an evaluation, promotion or opportunity for
upgrade and this pressure creates an unsafe situation.
A factor when company policy on human resources issues does not indicate
company’s commitment to safety.
A factor when company policy related to drugs and alcohol on board ships
is not communicated and/or enforced on board, making it difficult for the
crew member to choose the correct actions, resulting in human error or an
unsafe situation.
A factor when the company does not investigate accidents/incidents
internally or else fails to appreciate that accident/incident investigation can
be the starting point of a safety analysis, resulting in lack of understanding
of the risk of the vessel, leading to an unsafe situation18.

Factor ‘OC 104’ captures investigations conducting by managing companies with the purpose to
apportion blame. Situations where notwithstanding the company’s awareness of similar accidents,
safety information is not passed to the fleet, are captured under factor ‘OR 208’.
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Culture (OC 200) - Factors in a mishap when the unofficial or unspoken rules, values,
attitudes, beliefs, and customs of a company contribute to human error or unsafe
situation.
OC 201
OC 202

OC 203

xxxvii

A factor when the expression of personal and organisational values
demonstrates improper actions and are endorsed by the managing company.
A factor when the managing company does not understand the underlying
beliefs and/or philosophies of crew members resulting in inadequacies in
the development of the safety management system.
A factor when safety is considered to be a priority rather than a core value
and operational principle, resulting in safety becoming redundant to other
matters when priorities shift as a result of environmental demands.
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STATUTORY: Factors in a mishap if the regulator’s regime is either sub-standard or
lacks the necessary depth, leading to an unsafe situation. FS xxx
International/national standards (FS 000) - Factors in a mishap when the process of
setting international standards or part thereof contributes to human error or an unsafe
situation.
FS 001
FS 002

xxxviii

A factor when the rule-making process fails to anticipate potential risks
involved, resulting in a loop-hole/weakness in international regulations.
A factor when regulations do not keep pace with technological changes,
leading to an unsafe situation.
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Flag state implementation (FS 100) - Factors in a mishap when the process of
enforcement of regulations at national level is sub-standard and this situation
contributes to an unsafe situation.
FS 101
FS 102

FS 103
FS 104

19

A factor when due to several constraints, the flag State Administration is
unable to provide adequate oversight to a ship and its managers.
A factor when the flag State Administration, which has delegated its
authority to an RO, is not able to satisfy its responsibility by, inter alia,
monitoring the performance of the RO’s activity on its behalf.
A factor when a class or statutory survey fails to capture a deficiency in the
system leading to an unsafe situation.
A factor when safety information (including safety lessons from accident
reports) or other pertinent literature emanating from the IMO, NGOs or
consultative bodies is not communicated to the ship owner, manager or
master of the vessel, leading to inadequate dissemination of safety
information19.

The inadequate dissemination must be a contributing factor to an accident.
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